YES, a simple "Eastern 401, CHECK ALTITUDE" from the air traffic controller would have stopped this chain of events immediately. Instead, when the aircraft triggered a Minimum Safe Altitude Warning alert he noticed they were not at 2,000ft as assigned but 900ft he queried, "Eastern, ah 401 how are things comin' along out there?" Perhaps in 1972 the attitude was different (?) but a 1,100ft altitude bust can certainly result in an FAA enforcement action against a crew today. The controller would later testify that he thought there was something wrong with his radar scope, not the altitude of the airplane. So, why didn't he ask and confirm where the problem was???
Regarding the 1994 Roselawn ATR crash and the Captain managing a crisis:
The icing issue that brought down this flight was a KNOWN PROBLEM- the wing deicing boot coverage was insufficient. Three times before the Roselwan crash, the FAA restricted how ATRs could be flown in icy weather. Each time, the FAA lifted the restrictions after manufacturer Aérospatiale made mechanical fixes and changed pilot procedures. The ATR-72 airplane and nearly identical ATR-42, experienced at least 12 unexpected rolls and stalls (what the NTSB dryly calls "departures from controlled flight") between '85-'95 related to ice buildup on its wings. On three different occasions- in Detroit in 1986, in Italy in 1987 and lastly October 31 1994 - two ATRs flying through the same bad weather systems went out of control on the same day. Four of the six aircraft in those incidents survived; two, including Eagle 4184, crashed. Yet the French aircraft manufacturer did what they could to lay blame with the crew of 4184 and NOT their aircraft design (Duh, lawsuits!). Thus, the French accident report is quite skewed for obvious reasons.
Former Stewardess, you assume after reading the French report "had the Captain remained in the cockpit at the controls, the situation with the icing most certainly would have been noticed". The icing WAS NOTICED. A full 17 minutes before the crash in fact (they talk about it on the CVR)- and icing was anticipated in those conditions at that temperature aloft. The crew was already doing what they should have been- using the deicing boots to remove ice accumulation. (Unlike aircraft with heated leading edge wing areas, this aircraft can only remove accretions of ice- not prevent buildup.) What they weren't aware of was a ridge of ice could form on the top of the plane's wings, BEHIND their pnuematic boots, where it couldn't be removed and that this ice could make the aircraft more difficult to fly if not render it totally uncontrollable.
When the crisis did occur, the Capt was in the cockpit. But there was nothing he- or anyone- could have done. From the first second of the crisis to impact 25 seconds passed. Not even half a minute! The ATR flipped on its side in a 70-degree roll. Then it rolled farther right, nearly turning over, its nose pitched down. Within seconds, the plane was inverted, turning a full spiral before it contacted terrain. Both pilots grabbed the controls and fought in vain with all their might to right the ATR all the way to the ground. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was "loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots."
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