This article was written shortly before Israel assassinated the Deputy Head of
Hamas Political Bureau Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut on January 2. The assassination
is a further illustration of the Israeli government's desire to escape the
consequences of its disastrous war in Gaza, by igniting a regional conflict.
The clashes between Hezbollah and Israel are the closest to an actual war that
the Lebanon-Israel border has seen since the war of 2006, which resulted in a
rushed Israeli retreat, if not outright defeat.
We often refer to the ongoing conflict between Lebanon and Israel as
'controlled' clashes, simply because both sides are keen not to instigate or
engage in an all-out war.
Obviously, Hezbollah wants to preserve Lebanese lives and civilian
infrastructure, which would surely be seriously damaged, if not destroyed,
should Israel decide to launch a war.
But Israel, too, understands that this is a different Hezbollah than that of the
1980s, 2000 and even 2006.
Compared to Israel's behavior in the war of 2006, the Israeli response to
Hezbollah's military action - compelled by its solidarity with the Palestinian
Resistance in Gaza - is greatly tamed.
For example, the 2006 war was presumably provoked by a Hezbollah attack on
Israeli soldiers, which killed three. (Hezbollah says that the soldiers violated
Lebanese sovereignty, as the Israeli army has indeed done numerous times before
and since then.)
That single event led to a major war that wreaked havoc on Lebanon, but also
resulted in the retreat and defeat of the Israeli army.
Imagine what Israel would have done by the standards of the 2006 war if
Hezbollah had killed and wounded hundreds of Israeli soldiers, bombed scores of
military bases, installations and even settlements, as it has done, on a daily
basis, since early October.
A Different Hezbollah
Despite numerous threats, Israel is yet to go to war with the main objective of
pushing Hezbollah forces past the Litani River, thus supposedly securing the
border Jewish settlements. But why the hesitation?
First, Hezbollah fighters are much stronger than before.
For years, Hezbollah has fought in traditional warfare settings, namely in
Syria, thus producing a generation of battle-hardened fighters and commanders,
who are no longer bound to the rules of guerilla warfare, as was the case in the
past.
Second, Hezbollah's missile capabilities have exponentially grown since 2006,
not only in terms of numbers - up to 150,000 according to some estimates - but
also in terms of precision, explosive capabilities and range.
Moreover, Hezbollah has excelled in the development of its own rockets and
missiles, which include the powerful Burkan, a short-range rocket, which can
carry a heavy warhead, between 100 to 500 kilograms. This makes Hezbollah, in
some ways, self-sufficient in terms of weapons, if not munitions.
Third, Hezbollah's sophisticated Radwan Elite Units and an elaborate tunnel
system that goes deep inside northern Israel, would force Israel to contend with
a whole different military reality than that of the last war, should a major
military conflict break out.
Fourth, the Israeli army itself is in tatters, demoralized, greatly exhausted
and weakened by ongoing daily losses on the Gaza front. It is hardly in a state
of preparedness to fight a long and more difficult war against a better prepared
enemy.
That in mind, one must not take such comments as that of Israel's Defense
Minister Yoav Gallant too seriously when he says that his country is fighting a
war on seven different fronts. In actuality, the Israeli army is still fighting
a single war in Gaza, a difficult war that it is not winning.
-- Cont'd at https://www.palestinechronicle.com/a-genocidal-maniac-what-is-netanyahus-ultimate-goal-in-the-middle-east/
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