-I don't buy the "grandeur" thing. More he saw the danger of a further foreign engineered collapse of the core historical Russia itself rather than as previously, the Soviet Union.
...convinced with belief in the irreversible decline of Western hegemony.
-I have seen no evidenence that Putin believed that The West was in any way in decline...never mind irreversibly. It's predatory actions around the Russian periphery declared the opposite to be the case.
The second was military: Russia had become over-confident due to its successes in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria against much weaker forces.
-Not over-confident: merely assured of a degree of competence. Syria and Georgia were US proxy affairs so relative " weakness" would be a difficult matter to assess. Indeed Russian resources applied in both situations were quite parsimonious.
The third was political: support for his regime was beginning to flag and playing the nationalist card was popular.I
No. Putis popularity was at 69% which would be pretty phenomenal for any western leader who had served in office as long as he already had. It actually rose to 71% before the invasion.
Fourth was Putin’s contempt for Ukrainians,
-Nope. He is on record stating his belief that Russians and Ukrainians are " brothers"; as likewise Belarusians are "one people".
intensified by growing divergences between the two regimes;
-Umm... Ukrainian divergence cause by a US backed Nazi coup...
as like many aggressors before him, he despised his enemies and disparaged their powers.
-Despised Nazis after more than 20 million? Russians died the last time the ugly ideology reared is head? Well quelle surprise.
But Ukrainans, equipped with modern weapons and fuelled by the emotional power of defending their homeland, fought with skill, courage and tenacity.
Fighting hard with tenacity is all very well and good but what for? They bankrupted the entire nation and slaughtered their sons for the fantasies of Nazi zealots and promises from western "friends"...
Initial Russian setbacks lasted long enough for anger to grow abroad.
- The original attack was actually astonishing in its success. They setback was caused because the Russians realy wanted a peace deal: one with Ukraine returned to what its constitution declared which was a neutral state. This matter was then frustrated by Boris who came by with promises of unlimited support: "as long as required" from its western masters.
Putin had unintentionally strengthened the solidarity of his foes and the West’s response was stronger and more united than he had expected.
-Putin hoped Ukraine would return to neutrality But the West fancied its chances. they in fact hoped to break Russia on the financial battlefront but lost because they misunderstood the crucial difference between share prices and resources.
But it should not have surprised him, for the US could now seize the opportunity to cut Russia down to size without committing its own troops.
-Putin saw it for what it was: yet another proxy gamble by the west.
Biden was able to fight a proxy war,Putin was not.
-Which is why of course Russia won't lose.
Caught in the middle of their irrational struggle were mangled Ukrainian bodies and devastated cities.
-Oh indeed.
I'm afraid after that I can't be bothered reading the rest of the guys " take"...
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