https://karlof1.substack.com/p/corruption-in-russia-the-timur-ivanov

I hadn’t at all planned to write anything about Timur Ivanov or his criminality, but that all changed when I visited Marat Khairullin’s Telegram to read his update where he had written a long expose about Ivanov instead. Since much of the Oligarch 1990s and first portion of Putin’s years were so deeply mired in corruption and little is written about it in the West, I’ve always wanted to know more about this aspect of Russia’s past. Marat is clearly a student of those times and has a great deal of contextual background into those events as well as those of a more recent vintage. IMO, readers will be just as fascinated with Marat’s writing as I was. You’ll discover the very Russian way of dealing with this issue that differs greatly from the Chinese method while retaining just a bit of Stalin’s method. It also provides insight into the methods of the West when it comes to exerting influence and undermining governments from within. Yes, the read is long, but when you finish most will want to read more.

Is the arrest of Timur Ivanov a black mark for Shoigu?

The arrest of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov literally blew up the entire Russian Internet - what is behind it? There are two main versions. The first is treason. The second is a black mark for Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Let's try to figure out how true each of them is.
Moreover, over the past 24-hour period, there has been a accumulation of facts that are imperceptible to a wide range of facts (I would even say streaks), which can be used to judge the content of this case.

So, let's start with the first version.

The motive of treason is definitely present, since the military counterintelligence of the FSB, which was in charge of this case, is not engaged in construction. Another thing is that we are not talking about pure treason (in the criminal sense of the term). Rather, it is about a kind of common loyalty, where everything is built on half-tones.
This is a special internal security system "friend or foe", built by Putin's team, which grew up in the conditions of the constant blurring of the coordinates and goals of national policy by the Western comprador lobby. Positioning in this internal system of "friend or foe" is a marker that is constantly present in all high-profile cases of this kind in recent years.

This Jesuit and non-public system of target designation for the justice of the system of state administration built by Putin is a direct reaction to the equally sophisticated and very cunning policy of the West, which is aimed at destroying our statehood.

The Prigozhin case is very characteristic in this regard. Prigozhin, outwardly, seemed to be drowning for Russia all the time and positioned himself as a super patriot, but under this guise he committed such acts that he almost collapsed the entire front for us. I have repeatedly written that Prigozhin's rebellion coincided very well with the Ukrop counteroffensive. How did it happen?

There is a very well-founded version that Prigozhin's entourage manipulated Prigozhin in this way in the interests of the enemy. This is the main mechanism of the West's influence on our internal structure.

Agents of influence "on soft paws" penetrate into the entourage of top officials in order to pull the trigger at the right moment. As it happened with Prigozhin. Moreover, in his case, the enemies even managed to create an invisibility zone around the facility: law enforcement officers and special services were demonstratively not allowed into the territory controlled by the Wagners.

This is also the work of a disloyal environment, which, perhaps, for the time being, did not even know that it was acting in openly hostile interests.

An even more typical example is the series of criminal cases surrounding Dmitry Medvedev in the period after his resignation from the post of prime minister. The Magomedov case, the so-called "chess mafia" cases, the resignation and removal of Dvorkovich and Tkachev. Then they seriously cleansed his entourage of agents of influence.
If we talk about some Dagestani roots of Ivanov (and continue the line with the Magomedovs), then everything is even more indicative here.

Governor Abdulatipov and his daughter's husband, who fled to the West (now the owner of Forbes magazine). Oligarch Suleiman Kerimov and his long-term partner and assistant, State Duma deputy Hajiyev, who left for the West.

At the same time, note that Medvedev, Abdulatipov and Kerimov remained at large. This means that from the point of view of this "friend or foe" system built by Putin, they still remain loyal. In the case of the Russian State, it is important to note that this is [what it is].

In fact, this is exactly what we see today with the arrest of Ivanov. It is impossible to say unequivocally that now the trust in Sergei Kuzhugetovich will be undermined. Yes, it seems that agents of influence of the West have infiltrated his entourage. As before, they infiltrated the entourage of many Russian statesmen.

Shoigu, as the head of the relevant ministry, ensures our victory on the battlefield, and it would be strange if the smart, powerful and super-insidious enemy did not try to somehow influence him, as one of the most important tools of our common victory.

Now let us turn our attention to the exact manner in which General Ivanov was arrested. He was brought to the court in uniform, in fact, he was taken to the collegium of the Ministry of Defense.

In a very similar way, they arrested, for example, the Arashukovs, who tried to keep whole armies of guards around them, like Prigozhin and Ivanov.
Let me remind you that when Arashukov Jr. was arrested, the entire Federation Council was cut off from communication and blocked. That is, they clearly understood who they were dealing with.
Obviously, the "potaps" have been sitting on Ivanov's ears for more than one year. And, for example, the fact that Ivanov was taken on a bribe of a million rubles indicates that he and his entourage have already received 150 and one warning to improve. But the Ivanovo gang stupidly ignored them.

Now, as for corruption. If we are talking about a kind of collective Putin, we must understand that although the conditional fight against corruption is still a priority of our governing state team, its understanding and priorities in eradication have undergone a significant evolution.

Our country is ruthlessly fighting against the so-called socially significant corruption - this is when the majority of citizens suffer directly from bribes. Here it arrives quickly, inevitably, and demonstratively.

But when it comes to the elites, Putin's managers have learned the hard way that if you mow down everyone according to the same algorithm, the system will come to a standstill very quickly.
Do you know, for example, why the public arrests of governors stopped? Because they, as if in spirit, laid out everyone who was in their share, and the task of a total clean-up of the region arose. Everyone had to be imprisoned. And who should work?

And the second point: the governors, who had not yet come under the gun, were wildly frightened and lost the initiative. And for the region, this means one thing - economic indicators are creeping down.

Therefore, now they are trying not to imprison governors and other economic entities, but simply to dismiss them - it is more useful for the economy.

The marker for prison, I repeat, in this case is the same - general disloyalty to our state.
That is, if an official steals as if loyally to the country, he is exposed and sent to retirement.
As a last resort, his plane will land somewhere in the wrong place - this Prigozhin's version is also present in the arsenal. In any case, the officials themselves firmly believe in it - well, thank God, if it helps to keep them in line.

It is more difficult with the security forces. If, for example, we are talking about a hypothetical police general, he is likely to be publicly exposed and shown all his golden toilets, since the people understand that they specifically stole these toilets from them.

In the case of Ivanov, there will definitely be no such resonance, since the economic flows from which he was fed are closed and non-public. And to publicly expose the depth to which the general has put his paw into the budget means to shake the entire system.

Moreover, there has already been a bitter experience. And Serdyukov and Vasilyeva, compared to Ivanov, are secondary school students.
Take, as an example, the case of the collector of a small military garrison. It had to be excavated, repaired and buried again. The builders honestly dug it up, but did not repair it, only lightly painted it, and then honestly buried it. So, the criminal case on this collector has already amounted to 350 volumes.

And the costs of endless examinations and damage to the normal life of the garrison are approaching the cost of the collector itself.

At the same time, the builders are sincerely surprised: why repair it, in the Soviet years they knew how to build it in such a way that it is still not possible to. It will stand for a few years. It is better not to break it with modern repairs. Maybe it is, but it should have been stated before taking on the object. What am I getting at?

To the fact that there is certainly corruption in the Ivanov case, but we will most likely not see the full depth of "this Mariana Trench". And we will only see the same million (as my good friend said - a million of what?)

One of the most effective examples of the fight against corruption was shown in his time by Viktor Zolotov, when he quietly imprisoned almost thirty generals inherited by the National Guard from the Internal Troops. It got to the point that some of the generals removed from the trough paid for Navalny's jeans. But Zolotov still brought the task of cleaning the new department from internal corruption to the end.

Although some of the corrupt officials still escaped arrest and were simply fired. And this is despite the personal resource that Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov has.

In other words, Ivanov's arrest is, of course, a purge of potential (or already real) agents of influence from the key agency. And part of the planned work to clean up corruption in the elite environment.

Do you know what is the clearest marker that the arrest of Ivanov (in the context of the fight against corruption) is, first of all, prevention? Can you imagine how many unidentified persons (who have actually been identified long ago) swallowed nervously at that moment – that's right, a lot.
And the state sends a signal to all of them: you walk free only by our great mercy, if tomorrow you do not improve, we will quickly establish it, and you will sit forever next to Ivanov and Borodin.
Yes, the composition of an organized crime group at the present time means that a person, most likely, will not be released. There can be only one way out - active cooperation with the investigation.

As for the fate of Sergei Shoigu as the head of the department, this incident will not affect it in any way. I've written many times before. Shoigu was chosen to be the frontman of this battle with the West a long time ago. Putin chose him for a reason, but for a number of important qualities that Shoigu possesses. First of all, it is the ability to build work in "complex teams".
Since the time of Grachev, the Ministry of Defense has been mired in its own intrigues and internal conflicts. Shoigu's main task was not just to unite the department, but to make it work as a single mechanism. Shoigu succeeded. As the manager of a complex, mega-large-scale project, he proved himself to be a master.

How much some of his general stole at the same time is a matter of tenth. He'll be dealt with.
The main thing is that Sergei Kuzhugetovich should not be distracted from saving the Motherland. That's exactly how it works now. The main thing is the salvation of Russia, and everything else will come later.

By the way, according to personal observation, the soldiers on the front like Kuzhugetovich. Some generals are not very good, but they love Shoigu and call him by his patronymic - Kuzhugetych, which means one of their own. Therefore, Putin will not remove it, he will definitely not. [Formatting original, emphasis mine]

Intrigue most certainly, and the basis for an excellent spy novel, a very different Russia House. RT has this short item that internally links to another. TASS has a more complete article here. What’s clear from Marat’s essay and ongoing news is Russia still has big issues with corruption that in some cases are used as leverage by the Outlaw US Empire to undermine Russia. Of course, we now have a huge crime with the theft of Russia’s frozen assets that became that way due to another crime, the illegal sanctions regime, which has now taken over media space. In a way, the ongoing geopolitical conflict can be reduced to cops versus robbers as can domestic politics in all too many nations. The capture and confinement of the Money Power is required for Humanity to attain Peace, Harmony and Balance, while somehow the destructive urge to attain more wealth than needed must be purged from the human psyche and ego via culture—the Midas Myth apparently didn’t go far enough or was misinterpreted by the wrong people.