https://sonar21.com/more-on-tactical-nuke-exercises-and-russian-escalatory-options/

I want to follow up on my recent article, Understanding Military Exercises, and give you a deeper understanding why Russia is doing a tactical nuke exercise and what is the Russian General Staff wanting to achieve.

The current Russian exercise did not spring out of a black hole nor was it hastily conjured up in a period of a week or two. The planning for this exercise started months ago, and it appears that Russia had it on the shelf ready to go when circumstances dictated. As a result of belligerent, hostile threats by France and the U.K. regarding deploying troops to Ukraine and beefing up Ukraine’s weapons supply with more sophisticated weapons, Russia launched a comprehensive diplomatic and military response three weeks ago. Foreign Minister Lavrov summoned the British and French Ambassadors to the Russian Foreign Ministry for a verbal dressing down. They were warned in stark terms that Russia would respond with all necessary force if such actions occur.

As Lavrov was delivering a diplomatic beatdown, President Putin announced that Russia would conduct a military exercise to test its ability to deploy and launch tactical nukes. So, what are the objectives of such an exercise besides scaring the shit out of the West?

The first objective is to test the readiness of the units and personnel who load the missiles and drive the launchers. These soldiers are not sitting around on their asses waiting for the red flare to go up. They have other duties they must perform every day. The first step in the exercise process — after the national command authority has made the decision to mobilize and deploy the tactical nuclear force — is the alert to the units. Once alerted, they have to ensure they have access to the nuclear tipped missiles, that those missiles are loaded into the launchers, that the launchers are in good operating condition and that the vehicles can be started.

The next phase of the exercise is the deployment of the various units to designated firing points. This means the launch vehicles are loaded and the crews jump on and then drive to the place where they are to set up and prepare for launch. There are several problems or tasks each unit must deal with — e.g., Do they have sufficient fuel, water and food? Do they know how to get to the location where they are supposed to deploy and ready the launchers? Do their communications with headquarters command work? Do they know the proper procedures to ready the missile or missiles for launch?

Then comes the moment of truth — either the order to launch is given or they are told to stand down and return to base. The reason the Russians are doing this is to evaluate whether or not they are ready to carry out such a mission. And therein lies the other purpose of the exercise — put the West on notice that Russia is dead-ass serious about using a tactical nuke if the West decides to enter the conflict.

How might Russia use a tactical nuke? I am going to post Danny Davis’ recent video interview with Ted Postol below. Ted discusses the difference between the tactical and the strategic warheads. One possible option (but an option of last resort for the Russians), use a one kiloton warhead on a Ukrainian airfield or base, such as Yavoriv, in Western Ukraine near the border with Poland. Yavoriv is a defacto NATO base and has been used for storing weapons and training mercenary forces.




Russia has several other options before it must consider the use of tactical nukes. They can intensify targeting of bases and assembly points where Western forces are operating. They can impose a no-fly zone over the Black Sea for Western ISR platforms and then destroy any assets that dare venture into the forbidden area. Russia can take out the Starlink satellite that is enabling Ukrainian battlefield communications. I think there is little chance the Russians will go after the satellite because the Russians are probably exploiting it for intel purposes and are becoming more adept at jamming communications when necessary.

Despite my initial alarm over the Ukrainian attack on the Russian ICBM radar site in Voronezh, the Russian news media is paying little attention to the matter. It is not clear what hit the buildings. Does not appear to be the work of an ATACMs missile. The hole punched in the side of the building on the right in the photo below, shows no signs of fire or explosive force. Just a hole. Nonetheless, it is still a serious escalation on the part of Ukraine. It is akin to hitting a civilian apartment building in Belgorod. It does not enhance Ukraine’s tactical or strategic capabilities nor does it weaken Russia’s. It is gratuitous violence, e.g., Ukraine’s punching a hole in a wall.

I hope you found this helpful.