https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/hezbollah-contained?pc=1644
Suleiman Mourad
04 December 2024 Politics

In the early morning of 27 November, a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah took effect. Its terms – drastically one-sided, reflecting the superior strength and leverage of the IDF – are as follows:

The Israeli army agrees to stop its military campaigns in Lebanon and withdraw within sixty days.
Hezbollah ceases its attacks on Israel and withdraws its fighters to north of the Litani River. Any Hezbollah military bases south of the Litani will be destroyed.
With logistical and military help from the US and French armies, Lebanon will deploy 10,000 soldiers to secure the area south of the Litani.
Displaced people can return to their towns.
Lebanon and Israel commit to the implementation of UN Council Resolution 1701, initially adopted to end the 2006 war, while retaining their mutual right to self-defence.
In line with the Resolution, the US and UN will mediate negotiations between Lebanon and Israel regarding unresolved issues along the ‘blue line’ (i.e., Israel’s violation of the de facto borders between the two countries).
The US and France will lead an ‘international campaign’ to support reconstruction and development in Lebanon.

As with previous ceasefires, there are a number of secret clauses agreed by Israel and the US that are probably more meaningful than the official ones. In 2006, Washington was supposed to help enforce Resolution 1701, but instead it stood by as Israel repeatedly flouted its terms – refusing to allow the UN peacekeepers to fulfil their mandate and rejecting any serious presence of the Lebanese army south of the Litani. So Hezbollah eventually returned to the south and rebuilt its military infrastructure there. Will it be any different this time? Less than a week after the agreement, it is estimated that Israel has already violated it on 100 different occasions, carrying out home demolitions near the border, launching repeated air raids, shelling southern towns and villages, firing at returning civilians and flying low-altitude drones over Beirut. Hezbollah has responded with a largely symbolic volley of mortars – but, for now, the group seems willing to tolerate Israel’s continuing aggression rather than return to full-scale hostilities.

This lopsided deal is, perhaps most notably, a sign that Hezbollah has ended its military campaign in support of Palestine. In October 2023, the party declared a ‘unity of fronts’ in solidarity with Hamas and against Israeli atrocities in Gaza. Since then, it has been bruised by the unrelenting conflict: losing its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his successor Hashem Safieddine, along with pretty much all of its military top-brass and around 2,000 to 2,500 regular fighters. It is far from defeated; its political cadre remains almost entirely intact. But with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that its leadership overestimated its own strength and underestimated Israel’s dirty war tactics – on full display in its lethal pager and walkie-talkie attacks.

Hezbollah has therefore begun to chart a different course over the past week. In his address on 29 November, the new secretary general Naim Qassem set out the party’s priorities: supporting the Lebanese army’s mission, providing resources for the reconstruction effort, electing a new president and fully engaging in the domestic political system, based on the 1989 Taif Agreement which ended the civil war. The final pledge was the most striking. Since its establishment in 1982, Hezbollah has sought to keep its power base separate from the organs of the state – working mostly outside of them, and only agreeing to enter parliament and municipal government after a long period of hesitation. Its influence over Lebanon’s army and judiciary is negligible. It has tried to avoid being tainted by the graft and corruption that permeates such institutions. But given the damage Israel has inflicted on the group and its social base, Hezbollah now seems ready to forfeit some of this autonomy and integrate into the establishment: becoming more of a governing force than a militant one.

There are a number of implications for the Lebanese political situation. First, Israel’s annihilatory campaign against Shiite areas translated into an unprecedented level of solidarity with Hezbollah, which consolidated its reputation as the only serious defender of this community. But how long will this mood last if the group begins to play a greater role in overseeing the reconstruction process – which is bound to suffer from the usual sleaze and malfeasance – and managing a collapsing economy? Will it squander its popular appeal by refusing to mount a forceful retaliation to Israel’s ongoing attacks?

Second, having succeeded in weakening Hezbollah militarily, the US and Israel will now be keen to weaken it politically by enflaming Lebanon’s sectarian divisions. The US ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, has already been working hard to foment a sectarian civil war. She has so far been unsuccessful, but the country remains vulnerable to this kind of subterfuge, especially as its economic situation continues to deteriorate under the weight of Israeli bombs. With around 100,000 housing units either partially or fully destroyed, thousands of people displaced and many businesses shuttered, the World Bank estimates that the costs of the war amount to some $8.5 billion.

Third, in Lebanon’s volatile political environment, Hezbollah’s reversal might prompt a wider process of realignment. The party’s main Christian ally, Gebran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, could view its greater involvement in internal affairs as a form of unwanted competition. Although he is currently on the US sanctions list because of his support for Hezbollah, he may now seek an accommodation with the Western powers: turning against their rivals and, in return, getting them to bless his corruption and tighten his grip on the Maronite community.

The current parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri – who leads the Amal Movement, the main alternative to Hezbollah within the Shia community – has acted as the first line of defense for Hezbollah over the last two months. He played a critical role in the negotiations with the US envoy (and former IDF lieutenant) Amos Hochstein, steadfastly resisting pressure for alterations to Resolution 1701. But Berri is now 86 years old and won’t be in post much longer. It is unclear whether another leader of his calibre can rise up within the Amal Movement while also maintaining harmony with Hezbollah. The worst-case scenario for the latter would be an antagonistic figure who would seek to challenge the party head-on.

Walid Jumblatt, meanwhile, remains a master tightrope-walker, whose main focus is on maintaining his family’s near monopoly on power within the Druze community. He knows that his Progressive Socialist Party can gain political clout by tactically aligning itself with Hezbollah against Israel. Yet, at the same time, there are a large number of Druzes who work in the Gulf region and whose economic wellbeing requires a measured distancing from Hezbollah. On 9 January 2025, the Lebanese parliament will meet to pick a new president, the post having been vacant for two years. Jumblatt’s parliamentary bloc of nine deputies could play a decisive role in electing either a moderate leader who is willing to work with Hezbollah, or one who is more amenable to the West. His decision could ease or escalate pressures on the party.

Then there is Samir Geagea, the head of Christian-based Lebanese Forces – a lone wolf figure, who is trying to mount a direct challenge to Hezbollah with the support of the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. So far he has made little headway, but given the dramatic turn of events in northern Syria, there appears to be a real prospect of Sunni–Shia conflict flaring up again across the region – which could work to the benefit of Geagea’s scheme.

What of Israel? Netanyahu is right to claim that the ceasefire represents a victory for his side. But the Zionists’ larger project – to market their militarized apartheid regime as a safe haven for Jews worldwide – looks less robust. Hezbollah was able to puncture Israel’s armour by forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands from its northern border region; it has successfully resisted the attempts to eradicate it as a political force; and it has highlighted Israel’s total dependence on weapons, advisors, intelligence, diplomatic cover, legal protection and propaganda from the US and Europe. Such a state, founded on ethnic cleansing and guilty of genocide, can hardly claim to provide perfect security for its citizens. Even if Hezbollah decides to pull back from armed resistance, another force will take its place.

Now, as Lebanon begins to embark on a long process of reconstruction, the scale looks daunting. Who will cover its costs? Iran has previously sent hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, enabling Hezbollah to administer relief and welfare programmes which bolstered its power within the Shiite community. But this time the Islamic Republic – grappling with its own economic malaise and reluctant to provoke further confrontation with Israel – may be less generous. Will Western or Gulf States move in to fill the vacuum, funding reconstruction in an attempt to increase their influence and disempower Hezbollah? This will depend in part on whether the US is willing to lift some of its sanctions against Lebanon and allow an economic reboot, or whether it will continue to stymie any serious recovery.

Choosing a new Lebanese president may involve a prolonged period of parliamentary arm wrestling, but the outcome will inevitably reflect the political balance of forces in the country. It may be an outwardly pro-Western candidate like Geagea, although his personal chances are very slim. Or it may be a contender who will try to compromise with all sides. But one thing is clear: it will not be a pro-Hezbollah figure. The Party of God is too battered from the fighting, and its future is too uncertain.