Security of Small States Bordering Great Powers

Georgia's Pragmatism vs. Norway's Self-Harm

Glenn Diesen

Jun 9

How do small countries bordering great powers ensure security and prosperity? States rarely constrain themselves, and the smaller states near great powers such as the US and Russia have historically had their sovereignty violated. If the smaller state invites a rival great power onto its territory for security, it can trigger an intense security competition. This is evident from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Ukraine. What is the solution for smaller countries such as Georgia?

Norway and Georgia share this security dilemma as both are small states bordering Russia. The security dilemma suggests that states can either refrain from arming themselves and become vulnerable to foreign aggression, or they can arm themselves but then provoke a response from the opponent. States can similarly join military alliances for security, although they can be seen as a frontline in a great power rivalry.

During the Cold War, Norway aimed to mitigate the security dilemma by balancing deterrence with reassurance. It was a member of NATO but did not accept foreign troops stationed on its soil and limited military activity near the Russian border in the high north. Sweden and Finland were neutral and thus also enjoyed decades of peace, stability, and prosperity.

The Unipolar Era

However, the balance of power ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was replaced by a unipolar—or hegemonic—world. This was problematic, as states do not constrain themselves, and a new security system was established based on dominance. The balance between deterrence and reassurance subsequently disappeared, as there was no longer a perceived need to accept constraints to reassure a weakened Russia. Norway agreed to host US military bases and accommodate more NATO activity in the Arctic, while more recently, Sweden and Finland joined NATO. The hegemonic security architecture was accompanied by a liberal ideology suggesting that NATO was a liberal democratic “force for good.” The security dilemma itself is dismissed as the ideology demands that NATO is referred to as a “defensive alliance”, even as it attacks other countries. Any calls for considering Russian security concerns threaten the ideology of a benign hegemon.

Georgia adjusted to the unipolar world by recognising that there was only one game in town. As NATO expanded, it became the only security institution in Europe, and the option was either to be on the inside or the outside. The return to bloc politics revived the zero-sum logic of the Cold War, and the most vulnerable states were those placed on the new dividing lines of Europe - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Russia became increasingly insecure and defensive. When a great power begins to fear for its security and existence, its neighbours will likely suffer. Georgia’s pursuit of NATO partnership was a contributing factor in the war in the summer of 2008, which resulted in the loss of 20% of its territory.

Countries such as Georgia and Norway have the same freedoms as Mexico—they can form political and economic partnerships as they wish, but cannot host the soldiers and weapon systems of a rival great power such as the US.

The Multipolar Era

The seemingly menacing presence of Russia to the north and NATO’s efforts to use Georgia as a proxy against Russia create a difficult security dilemma. Avoiding excessive dependence on a more powerful foreign actor is important to enhance political sovereignty. Multipolarity incentivises small states in Europe to diversify foreign partnerships to mitigate the security dilemma. Georgia can avoid becoming a vassal of either Russia or the West in a divided Europe by diversifying its economic partnerships and also linking itself with other centres of power, such as China.

Realist theory recognises that states must respond to the international distribution of power to increase their sovereignty and security. In the current era, small states must adjust from unipolarity to multipolar. The US has fewer resources relative to other powers, and its priorities will shift from Europe to Asia. This requires small states to restore the balance between deterrence and reassurance.

The Norwegians are not adjusting to the new international distribution of power. Norway has doubled down on their excessive dependence on the US and abandoned reassurance by increasing the provocative posture of the unipolar era, including participation in the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. As Norway-Russia relations deteriorate and the US shifts its focus elsewhere, Norway may find itself on a path to conflict and destruction unless it changes course.

Georgia, by contrast, has chosen a pragmatic path that recognises the international distribution of power. Georgia is diversifying its economic partnerships to avoid excessive dependence, and has withstood pressure to be used as a second front against Russia. As a connecting point between East and West, and between North and South, the emergence of multipolarity presents Georgia with both challenges and opportunities to its security and prosperity. To make the right choices, rational and realist analysis must prevail over ideology.