https://www.turbulenttimes.co.uk/news/front-page/defence-the-ajax-distraction/
By Richard North - November 27, 2025

Now it’s all over, we can get back to some sort of normality, although that word has to be used with caution when it comes to the train-crash of MoD defence procurement which brought us the never-ending delight of the Ajax AFV series.

Actually, the latest development in this sorry saga came to light before la Reeves strutted her stuff, but such has been the intensity of pre-budget speculation that the story, which appeared in The Times two days ago, barely registered.

The headline was startling enough, declaring: “Army halts use of Ajax fighting vehicles after 31 soldiers fall ill”, with the sub-head adding the detail that: “Members of two regiments suffered health problems after taking part in a war game in the troubled armoured vehicles, which were declared safe this month”.

From the story text we learned that soldiers had emerged from the £10 million vehicles vomiting while others were said to be shaking so violently they could not control their bodies after war games on Salisbury Plain, sources said. Others had weakness in their legs.

The problem had affected thirty-one soldiers from the Household Cavalry and the Royal Lancers after they had spent 10 to 15 hours in the vehicle during an “Iron Fist” exercise which had taken place over the weekend, only weeks after Luke Pollard, a defence minister, had showcased the vehicles and declared them safe for operations.

The story in The Times has since been repeated elsewhere, picked up by the Mail and many others, including Sky News which has former Times defence correspondent, Deborah Haynes, writing an analysis piece under the heading: “The army’s Ajax fighting vehicle injured troops and cost billions – there must be accountability”.

Her more detailed sub-head declares that “Ajax vehicles have been proclaimed as ‘world class’, but they have have (sic) left British soldiers in hospital and problems identified over several years seem to have persisted. Ministers will want answers”.

Pundits on social media have been quick to pile in with technical background while Jack Watling of RUSI piles in with a “told you so” tweet drawing attention to a piece he had written in July 2021, at which point he had observed that the Army faced a stark choice.

The fundamental question coming from ministers, he wrote, “is whether the Army wants Ajax”, noting that the Army had not expected to lose Warrior during the Integrated Review, and now found itself without a coherent warfighting doctrine.

In this context, Watling wrote, “there is real concern that the decision on Ajax will pre-empt and pre-determine how the Army must structure to fight. The alternative to Ajax is viable, but only if the Army can be clear and concise in setting out what is required”.

I don’t suppose many will immediately understand the significance of this comment by Watling is saying is that the adoption of this piece of equipment, the Ajax, will shape the structure of the Army and determine how it intends to fight its battles.

Long before reading this, I had already posted a short comment about the latest development, stating that the continued problems were “good news” if that meant that these tactically obsolete vehicles would not be used. In my view, the order should be cancelled and what money is released should be invested in drones.

And therein lies the real story. While the media and most of the pundits are focused on the noise and vibration issues, the crucial point is that this vehicle should never have been ordered in the first place.

In this, there is no question of me being a “johnny come lately” on this issue or being wise after the event. The Ajax vehicle is one of the remnants of the cancelled FRES (Future Rapid Effects System) which emerged in the early years of this century, about which I first wrote in July 2004 and, over the following decade wrote 120 blogposts with references to the system.

This series culminated in a piece in September 2014 when I first wrote about what was to become the Ajax (then called the Scout SV), under the heading: “remembering everything, learning nothing”.

At the time, 589 vehicles had been ordered at an estimated cost of £3.5 billion, with David Cameron, attending the two-day NATO summit in Newport, S. Wales, saying that the deal would aid UK security and “underpin” many jobs, reminding people that it would be the Army’s largest single order for armoured vehicles for more than 30 years.

“These new vehicles are testament to the world-class engineering skills in south Wales and across the UK, helping to create the Army’s first fully digitalised armoured vehicles”, he warbled, leading me to comment that this rhetoric didn’t get close to the reality.

To me, the order demonstrated that we had an Army that was remembering past days of glory, yearning after the battlefields of yore, dominated by free manoeuvre and the exhilaration of the mobile battle.

It also demonstrated, in my view, that the Army still (after decades of discussion as to its role) didn’t have the first idea of what sort of battles it is going to have to fight in the future and, as it so often did, was selecting kit for the battles it would like to fight, rather than the ones to which it will be committed.

Thus, I observed, we end up with a clanking, heavily armoured scout vehicle. At 42 tons, it is more than twice as heavy as the original concept, which demanded air mobility based on the C-130 platform. But nothing short of a giant C-17 will lift one of these, and then only one at a time.

And for all that, despite the weight and armour, its protection against IEDs would be poor – as we had seen even with the uparmoured Warriors, which had been extremely vulnerable in certain counter-insurgency operations.

Since then, of course, we have had the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine which, with the advent of the cheap FPV “kamikaze” drone, has revolutionised warfare in a way that could not have been predicted even as late as 2014, and certainly not back in 2004 when the vehicle role and capabilities were defined.

Some have argued that the vehicle’s additional armour would give it greater protection from drones than most armoured vehicles currently fielded, but this does not take account of the integrated Russian anti-armour measures.

These are highly sophisticated, relying on a multi-layer combination of anti-tank mines, guided 152mm artillery munitions, and anti-tank guided missiles, which can be launched from the ground or, at long range, from helicopters flying in safe territory beyond the forward edge of the battle area, as well as a variety of attack drones.

On a battlefield under constant and intense surveillance, a vehicle such as the Ajax, with a huge thermal, acoustic and radar signature, would be picked up within minutes of making an appearance and would be singled out for sustained attack as a priority target.

The technology which currently dominates the battlefield cannot be un-invented yet, as Watling indicated, reinforced by my piece earlier this month, the Army seems determined to fight a war of its own liking, rather that the type of war being fought in the real world.

It is in that context that the fielding of the Ajax will shape the Army’s operational thinking and define its doctrines – putting the cart before the horse. Yet, rather like field marshal Helmuth von Moltke’s famous observation that “no plan ever survives contact with the enemy”, these will crumble the first time the vehicle is called upon to join a real fight.

This current round of problems, therefore, provides the Army with what could be its last opportunity to ditch this troubled vehicle which is based on an unproven philosophy from over 20 years ago, relying on operational assumptions that were flawed at their very inception.

The great danger is that, with the media concentrating on the noise and vibration problems, this paves the way for the Minister, who claims that the use of the vehicle has only been paused “out of an abundance of caution”, to order a technical fix which will see the return of the vehicle to service.

To that extent, the media is distracting us from the main issue – that the vehicle in any form is unsuitable for the modern battlefield – even if the current technical problems are resolved. The thing is an expensive and potentially lethal liability.