Reliable technical reports indicate that Iran is locally jamming Starlink
service reception, particularly during periods of internet shutdowns. This is
carried out in practice by jamming GPS (GNSS) signals and interfering with the
communication frequencies between ground user terminals and satellites, signals
that are known to be weak and easily overwhelmed by stronger transmissions. This
method results in a noticeable degradation of connection quality and an increase
in packet loss of approximately 30%, without the need to disrupt the network
globally, which is consistent with known electronic warfare capabilities from a
technical standpoint.
-- https://nitter.net/Intel_Sky/status/2009768947025907811
9 Jan 2026 · 11:27 PM UTC

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... Starlink terminals do not rely on GPS to "find satellites" in real
time. GPS/GNSS is mainly used for timing, initial location, and network
synchronization.
The primary degradation comes from uplink and downlink RF interference on the
Ku/Ka bands between the user terminal and the satellites.
GNSS jamming can contribute to instability, but on its own it does not explain
sustained packet loss rates around 30%. That level of degradation is consistent
with direct RF jamming or noise flooding of the Starlink communication
frequencies, which are inherently low-power and vulnerable.
This is not about power or the national grid. It is targeted electronic warfare
against satellite communications at the RF level, applied locally.