UAVs Cont'd
Other pivotal systems include the Shahed-149 'Gaza', the Ababil, and the Mohajer
series, which are essential for ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance) and coordinating anti-ship strikes. Additionally, the Karrar
serves as a versatile platform capable of carrying air-to-air missiles for
aerial engagements. By leveraging these low-cost, high-endurance systems, Iran
can effectively saturate enemy defenses with minimal financial investment.

U.S. Bases Are Dangerously Exposed
Most American forward bases lie perilously close to Iran. Al-Udeid Air Base
(Qatar) is less than 300 km from the Iranian coast (a facility that cost roughly
$10 billion). The U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters (Bahrain) is just over 200 km from
Iranian territory. The bases held a highly detrimental position in an all-out
conflict as Iran has large stocks of older missiles with a range of 300 km. Iran
could use them to overwhelm Patriot batteries. Moreover, bases in the UAE,
Kuwait, and eastern Saudi Arabia are all within 700 km, well inside the range of
Iranian short range missiles and thousands of drones. In case of conflict, it
would become impossible to operate these bases, considerably reducing logistical
capacity.

Long-Range "Stand-Off" Attacks Are Practically Impossible
Operating from a safe distance (e.g., 1,000 km offshore in the Arabian Sea),
carrier aircraft (F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-35C) lack the combat radius to reach
deep into Iran, especially Tehran. Aerial refueling would require tankers
operating in contested airspace, a high-risk proposition. Even Tomahawk missiles
(standard range 1,600-1,700 km, extendable to 2,500 km in some variants) would
struggle to hit Tehran from that distance, forcing ships closer to the coast and
into greater danger.

There is no realistic scenario of a "limited strike and quick withdrawal."
Iran's military-industrial base, hardened by decades of sanctions, is built for
a prolonged war. Its forces were specifically designed for this environment:
shallow waters, short interior lines of communication, and vast numbers of
cheap, distributed weapons.

Tehran lies nearly 1,000 km from the coast, far beyond the easy reach of
carrier-based aircraft without deep penetration into hostile airspace. The only
way to heavily strike the capital would be from bases in Azerbaijan, as Israel
appears to have done on two occasions.

Antiship Missiles

Above 700 km
Iran has developed and fielded multiple long-range anti-ship missiles capable of
striking targets well beyond the Persian Gulf and into the Arabian Sea.

The three main systems include the Abu Mahdi, a turbojet-powered, sea-skimming
anti-ship cruise missile with a confirmed range exceeding 1,000 km. In 2023 the
IRGC Navy announced versions reaching 2,000 km and up to 2,600 km in
submarine-launched variants. The Qadr-474, is an advanced ship-launched
anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 2,000 km, already equipped on IRGC Navy
vessels including the Shahid Mahdaviand Shahid Soleimani classes. And, third,
the Zolfaghar Basir, an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range
exceeding 700 km (some sources claim up to 1,000 km when ship-launched),
equipped with an optical seeker optimized for moving ships and launched from
mobile coastal or island platforms.

Hypersonic and Long-Range Ballistic Systems for Naval Strike
Iran has adapted and tested several long-range ballistic missiles in the
anti-ship role, as the Emad (1,700 km), Ghadr (2,000 km), the Fattah-2, a
hypersonic glide vehicle variant with claimed range up to 2,000 km and the Sejji
variants(2,500 km). Some were fired more than 1,800 km into the Indian Ocean
against simulated naval targets during Great Prophet 15 (January 2021) while a
U.S. carrier strike group was in the area.

The Iran-China-Russia(-Strait) Play
With Patricia Marins
In the above-described environment, a naval battle heavily favors Iran. Large
U.S. surface ships would face a "swarm of mosquitoes" threat the U.S. Navy has
not confronted in decades. The risk of significant casualties is high. Even a
successful initial strike would likely be followed by rapid Iranian
reconstitution, supported most likely by China and Russia, leaving the regime
intact and its stock of enriched uranium (currently reportedly 440 kg) still in
its hands. Only a large-scale ground operation would be sufficient to deliver
the "strategic goals" the U.S. president has asserted (we return to these
below).

The information Tuomas received from his Finnish-Iranian contact at the end of
last week indicates that the momentum is changing in favor of Tehran. The
country stands united with its leadership enjoying support it has not seen in
decades. This forms a notable "strategic" support for the Iranian leadership to
act as it sees fit against any foreign or domestic enemy. In addition, there are
two strategical aspects supporting the Iranian regime.

Cont'd but paywalled...