10 May 2026
https://thecradle.co/articles/hezbollahs-battlefield-doctrine-after-the-2024-shock

Lede: Between the bruising lessons of 2024 and the renewed confrontation of
2026, Hezbollah and Israel both raced to adapt - one under fire, the other
through rehearsals for a wider multi-front war.

Hezbollah's military thinking is layered, cumulative, and difficult to
penetrate. No academic researcher, and not even an intelligence analyst, can
credibly claim to have gathered all its components, analyzed them in full, or
understood how they interact.

That complexity also shapes how the party learns and extracts
lessons. Hezbollah's added advantage, however, is the speed with which it
adapts. The clearest evidence is the change in its security and military
performance between two wars separated by only 15 months - a period in which the
party remained under continuous fire.

The 2024 war forced Hezbollah into a painful review of how it fought, how it
deployed, and how much of its command structure could survive when the opening
blows came hard and fast. The lessons were not drawn in seminar rooms, but by
fighters and commanders who had lived the previous battle, absorbed its losses,
and then found themselves preparing for the next one before the smoke had
cleared.

This account rests on interviews conducted over roughly a year after the 2024
war with Hezbollah security and military officials. They say no visual or audio
documentation can be presented because of the latest "harsh security lessons."
Israel was conducting its own review at the same time, using the final months
before the renewed confrontation to rehearse for a long, multi-front war that
Hezbollah and Iran were watching closely.

Fighting from 2024 to 2026
In Tel Aviv's planning view, the southern Lebanon battlefield is divided into
two sectors: eastern and western. Its divisions are deployed accordingly, based
on the type of force each sector requires and on near-compulsory entry routes
imposed by the terrain - routes that have shaped the battlefield since 1978.

Hezbollah divides the south differently, into three sectors: western, central,
and eastern. Responsibility is split between the Nasr Unit, which handles the
eastern and central sectors south of the Litani River, and the Aziz Unit, which
covers the western sector. The Badr Unit, now heavily discussed again in Israeli
commentary during the 2026 confrontation, is responsible for the area north of
the Litani.

The Radwan forces were among Israel's central concerns in the previous war, when
it demanded that they be pushed north of the Litani. Their presence has returned
to Israeli discussion in the current war, with claims in early March that around
1,000 fighters were active. But Radwan is not tied to a fixed territory. It is
an elite force that can be redeployed according to the needs of each battle.

The figure of 1,000 Radwan fighters cited by Israel comes from its own claim
that 2,500 members of the unit remained combat-capable after the 2024 war, out
of an original force of 5,000, most of whom were wounded in the pager and
walkie-talkie attacks of September that year.

By Israel's own account, then, another 1,500 Radwan fighters have yet to enter
the battle. Hezbollah does not comment on these figures, either publicly or in
the private meetings conducted for this article and series.

What stands out in discussions of numbers, however, is a repeated observation
made by several planning commanders - including those working on information
files - and by field commanders who fought in 2006, Syria, the "support" front,
and the 2024 battle of the 'Possessors of Great Strength.' They agree that the
large number of fighters placed on alert along the front in 2024 sometimes
obstructed operations and contributed to losses and martyrdoms.

A planning commander tells The Cradle:
"There is an area that can only hold, for example, eight brothers for
defense... Any extra brother is effectively a martyr or wounded. In Uli al-Ba's
[Possessors of Great Strength], there was a major rush on several fronts that
could not be controlled, and this is what increased the number of martyrs."

A field commander puts the problem more concretely:
"During my rounds, I would see excess numbers of fighters to the point that
there were not enough trees for them to hide under... The lesson lies in
studying the place, understanding the human need, movement lines, and the
possibility of camouflage."

By contrast, what stands out in this war - at least in the Israeli narrative -
is repeated talk of smaller groups, usually no more than five or six fighters,
and sometimes only three or four at forward points, particularly in
ambushes. That suggests the lesson was absorbed. In Hezbollah's own accounts,
supply and rotation lines for fighters also improved and worked more effectively
in the 2026 war.

Many of the villages and towns that witnessed fierce clashes in 2024 returned to
the battlefield in 2026, though some names were absent because of the massive
destruction Israel inflicted during the 15 months of the previous ceasefire
agreement.

Adaisseh, a first-line confrontation point, saw intense clashes in the previous
war but not in the current one, while Khiam was central in both. Taybeh and Rabb
al-Thalathine in the eastern sector saw medium-intensity clashes in 2024 but
became much hotter fronts this time. Beit Lif, the legendary Bint Jbeil, and
Ainatha, among others, also stood out more clearly in the current round.

Even so, in both wars, Hezbollah worked to ensure that confrontation remained
present along the main axes and within specific villages and towns, even if only
to obstruct the enemy, for both symbolic and operational reasons.

Bayyadah, Maqam Shamaa, and the Ramiyeh-Qouzah-Aita al-Shaab triangle in the
western sector remained active, as did Yaroun and Maroun al-Ras in the central
sector, and Houla and Markaba in the east.

According to the former field commander, it was decided that each area would be
handled on the basis that "the brothers would perform their duty there until
their last breath," or withdraw from it, based on fire cover from the second and
third echelons in the confrontation, using new tools.

"In other words, any spot emptied of resistance will not necessarily be empty of
resistance, because there are several means of dealing with the Israeli army
there."

As for the decision - whether to remain until the last breath, to hit and run,
or to withdraw to another position or facility - it was left to the fighters on
the ground to make autonomously and personally.

Lessons of the previous war
Because of the severe blows at the start of the war - the pagers and the
assassination of commanders - along with the atmosphere of security suspicion
around all devices, the disruption of parts of the command chain, and gaps in
several missions, the defensive plan did not function well during the first
month of the 66-day confrontation.

In the second month, the pattern became clearer. Hezbollah's losses began to
fall, while casualties among Israeli soldiers and vehicles increased with
greater precision and effectiveness. For this reason, The Cradle's conversations
with cadres revealed frustration over the timing of the ceasefire agreement and
what followed on the ground.

One commander says:
"With our full commitment to our assignment, the truce came at a time when we
had begun to keep pace with the front and its requirements... Anyone who works
in the military knows how difficult it is to stop when the fighter has regained
the initiative. Even our use of qualitative missiles was subject to the
organizational decision, not personal assessment."

Based on the details gathered from these sources, the confrontation can be
divided into two phases.

During the first month, in the first-echelon villages, there were individual
clashes with the occupation, or clashes involving groups that had remained
steadfast there. But a full, coordinated defensive plan was difficult to
implement. Field improvisation dominated, especially because communication had
been cut with many fighters.

In the second- and third-echelon villages, anti-armor fire was difficult because
of intensive drone and warplane activity, the absence of Hezbollah air and naval
defenses, and Israel's deliberate preemptive bombing of any hill overlooking the
battlefield, even if it had not been used, to deny the resistance any benefit
from it.

The first month, in short, offered no possibility of establishing a clear
defensive pattern, militarily or in security terms. The months of the "support"
front during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood had already seen systematic Israeli efforts
to prevent Hezbollah from forming any defensive operating pattern.

During the second month, clashes in the first-echelon villages intensified in
accordance with the principle of "meeting" the enemy. This did not necessarily
mean holding villages and towns in a static way. Fighters would withdraw or lie
in wait inside a facility, then return to fight after heavy bombardment.

The effort often resembled martyrdom-style action. This pattern intensified in
the western sector, while in the eastern and central sectors, "meeting" the
enemy was harder because of exposed terrain and limited means. But whoever
survived the bombardment continued to engage once enemy forces approached.

In the second- and third-echelon villages, the work of the Kornet and Almas
teams improved noticeably, especially in the western sector - Blat, Zibqin, and
other areas - where better visibility and easier firing allowed more tanks to be
targeted.

Fighters would suddenly emerge from areas not recorded in the original defensive
plan, as an additional security measure, then withdraw quickly. This newly
developed tactic proved effective. The sources decline to publish the name of
the force that carried it out.

By the second month, fire support from north of the Litani had also intensified
and diversified, causing major Israeli losses, many of which were never
announced.

The resistance's own scorched earth
The final stage of the previous war included details now being disclosed for the
first time, both in their nature and scale. Their effects became apparent
quickly in the current war after further improvements and new techniques were
introduced. When Israel's "scorched earth" approach made direct engagement
impossible in many positions before any incursion, Hezbollah began developing
its own version within the limits of its capabilities.

Alongside the reconnaissance fed back by fighters on the ground who could still
reach command, Hezbollah began using its own strikes to gather live battlefield
intelligence. Each hit became a way to identify nearby vehicles, rescue teams,
redeploying soldiers, or new positions - and then strike them again. This
produced what sources describe as a compound method of action known as "parallel
reconnaissance."

For example, when an attack drone is launched against vehicles, its imaging is
live, not recorded, and can be jammed - or when an Almas missile is fired, with
live transmission and possible recording because it is controlled by fiber
optics, that drone or missile transmits a live image of the wider position or
adjacent vehicles.

At the same moment, coordinates are passed to artillery and rocket units north
of the river: another position, nearby vehicles, rescue forces, or soldiers
redeploying. These units need only minutes to enter the coordinates and hit the
forces again.

To carry this out, Hezbollah used a two-stage pattern.

The first strike could be carried out by an attack drone with a 10-35 kg
warhead, an Almas missile with a 7-15 kg warhead, or a Kornet with a range of
4-10 km. Its task was to land the first hit, inflict losses, and transmit new
coordinates.

The second strike could be carried out by artillery of various calibers - 81,
105, 120, or 130 mm, depending on the required range - or by 107 mm rockets, the
small Katyusha or Fajr-1 with a range of 12 km, 122 mm Grad rockets with a range
of 20-40 km, upgraded Grad rockets with fragmentation warheads that disperse
shrapnel before impact, or more advanced missiles such as Fajr-5, Malak-1 and 2,
or Fadi-1 and 2. Their purpose was to deliver the second hit, then repeat the
cycle.

If the first strike fails to produce confirmed losses, the second is designed to
do so. And even when neither lands decisively, the attacking force is still
thrown off balance, the advance loses momentum, and fighters along the contact
lines gain the opening they need to move or strike.

In the final weeks of the war, Hezbollah used the "second strike/subsequent
strikes" pattern in ways Israel did not expect, and which would become the
anticipated solution. It used cruise missiles, for example, against forces
advancing into Yaroun; Nasr-1 and Nasr-2 missiles against forces in Mays
al-Jabal; and Fadi-1 and Fadi-2 missiles, as well as Noor and Qader-1 and 2
ballistic missiles, against forces in Khiam.

According to one operations-room account, the resistance recorded 150 Israeli
soldiers killed or wounded in a single strike on Khiam. But the live feed showed
that many of the faces appeared "Asian," leading to an assessment that they were
mercenaries previously observed during the 2023 standoff over Hezbollah's
reconnaissance tents near the occupied Shebaa Farms.

Numerically, Hezbollah recorded hundreds of fires of this kind, with confirmed
hits on more than 66 tanks and vehicles by the end of November 2024, in addition
to dozens of troop gatherings in open areas or inside houses, where a special
type of Kornet was used.

At the time, Hezbollah's official tally from 17 September to 27 November 2024
was 1,666 military operations, including 1,285 rocket attacks, 93 artillery
fires, 166 drone attacks, and 86 guided-missile attacks using Kornet and similar
systems.

Regarding rocket fire launched from south of the river until the end of the war,
one fighter tells The Cradle:

"I had the opportunity to change the launcher's location with every strike, but
we decided to take the challenge to the highest level. We would fire from the
same point three or four times despite repeated airstrikes on it. We worked in a
pattern that made the occupation literally sick of this war ... We had to make
it feel that it was repeating the same mission more than once with no result."

The field result was that any Israeli army position, or anything resembling a
semi-base, became a direct target and a "danger zone." This explains Israel's
inability to occupy some villages and towns, despite the martyrdom of their
entire garrisons, such as Adaisseh. It also explains how Hezbollah was able, in
the final weeks, to move support forces through to places such as Khiam.

Israel, by contrast, followed a fixed sequence: enter after intensive
fire-clearing, rush engineering units in to mine and demolish buildings, take
showpiece photographs, then withdraw quickly. If the Israelis failed to kill the
resistance fighters inside, they would quickly call in aircraft to bomb the
entire building.

Resistance fighters attributed the speed of these airstrikes to the fact that
every Israeli company commander had a drone - a Hermes, for example - directly
under his command in the sky. This did not recur in the same way in the current
war because of the confrontation with Iran, but Hezbollah also had its own
solutions.

Cont'd ...