https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/israelis-vote-as-gaza-starves-little
A conversation with Professor Leila Hudson
Ian Proud
2 hours ago

Israelis head to the polls tomorrow, 27 October, while Gaza’s already catastrophic conditions continue to deteriorate. Bakeries are shutting, shelves are emptying, and the carefully calibrated controls that have shaped the territory for more than a thousand days are tightening further. Would a new Israeli PM offer any a different approach? Professor Leila Hudson of the University of Arizona is sceptical.

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In a conversation with Professor Hudson, we discussed why there is little reason to expect that a change of prime minister in Israel will produce a meaningful change of approach.

Hudson described an intensifying phase of restriction that appears timed to the election. The logic is familiar: manage the visible consequences of the war so that domestic politics can proceed with the least possible disruption.

The result on the ground is further pressure on an already starved population.

She was clear that this is not an isolated episode but the continuation of a pattern in which Gaza’s suffering is subordinated to Israeli political and strategic calculations.

On the question of leadership, Hudson was sceptical that a different prime minister would alter the underlying policy. She noted the broad societal acquiescence inside Israel for the tactics used since October 2023, and the limited political space for any leader to abandon the core objectives.

Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff who has emerged as a prominent opposition figure, was discussed as a possible alternative. His military background includes the Dahiya doctrine of disproportionate force; his public positioning has been more pragmatic on domestic issues such as the draft and on the need for Arab party support in any governing coalition. Yet Hudson saw little evidence that this would translate into a fundamental shift on Gaza itself.

A new leader might manage the campaign more efficiently or with greater domestic legitimacy; the direction of travel was unlikely to change.

The conversation then widened to the regional context in which these events are unfolding. Hudson argued that the old American protection bargain—the oil-for-security arrangement that underpinned US primacy in the Gulf—is quietly ending.

Regional actors are already hedging, building alternative relationships, and preparing for a multipolar order in which Washington is no longer the sole guarantor. Syria, under Ahmad al-Sharaa, has so far shown notable restraint, avoiding the open conflicts that some expected. At the same time, new Sunni defence arrangements linked to Mecca carry the risk of hardening sectarian lines if they are used as instruments of divide-and-rule.

Iran and other sanctioned states continue to develop parallel economic and financial networks that reduce their exposure to the dollar and SWIFT systems. These are not dramatic collapses, but steady adaptations to a world in which American coercive power is less decisive than it once was.

The picture that emerges is one of continuity rather than rupture. The Israeli election will produce a government, and that government will almost certainly continue the policies that have produced mass starvation in Gaza.

The larger regional order is already adjusting to the limits of American power. For those watching from outside, the immediate human cost remains the most urgent fact: Gaza continues to starve while Israelis vote, and there is little prospect that a new prime minister will reverse that reality.