The Lifeboat News
[ Message Archive | The Lifeboat News ]

    Big Serge - Russo-Ukrainian War: Schrodinger’s Offensive Archived Message

    Posted by sashimi on March 2, 2023, 12:24 pm

    A ramble about force design, Moldova, and a fortress on the steppe

    1 March 2023

    (quote)
    Where is the big Russian offensive? This is, at the moment, the million dollar
    question that inevitably intrudes on any discussion of the war's current
    course. It is probably not surprising (to those of us that are familiar with
    human nature, at least) that this question becomes a Rorschach test in which
    everybody sees their own prior assumptions about the Russian military.

    The answers to this question do indeed vary widely. On one extreme, there are
    those who believe that hundreds of thousands of Russian troops are prepared to
    launch an enormous "big arrow" offensive at any moment. We see this both from
    commentators like retired US Colonel Douglas MacGregor and from some Ukrainian
    sources who are likely trying to foment a sense of urgency to extract more aid
    from the west. On the other extreme, we have those who claim that the Russian
    military is so depleted that there will be no offensive at any point
    whatsoever. There are also some in the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment
    and Propaganda western intelligentsia, like the Nuland Institute for the Study
    of War or Michael Koffman, who argue that the offensive has already begun but is
    so lame and weak that nobody noticed.

    Okay. So either a giant offensive will happen any minute now (it might have just
    started while I was typing that), or it will never happen at all, or it already
    happened, or perhaps it's in a state of quantum superposition in which it has
    both succeeded and failed, at least until we open the box.

    A thorny issue indeed. There is, at the moment, a great deal of important and
    intense combat occurring in many different sectors of front - but what relation
    do these operations have to any big arrow action by the Russians? Is this an
    underwhelming entrée or an appetizer?

    I would like to suggest an alternative to all these theories, because what the
    world needs most right now is more opinions.

    At the moment, Russia has the initiative across the front. Ukraine's reserves
    are in a tenuous state right now (especially given their politically imposed
    mandate to try and accumulate a force for an offensive against the land bridge
    to Crimea), and Russia is driving high intensity combat in important sectors
    right now.

    These operations, I would argue, serve three different purposes at once. First
    and foremost, they are valuable shaping operations in their own right that have
    important implications for launching future operations. Secondly, they function
    essentially as spoiling attacks in that they keep the burn rate at the front
    high and degrade Ukraine's ability to form reserves. As a sort of metaphor for
    this, there are already rumors that some of Ukraine's new Leopard tanks will be
    sent into combat around Bakhmut rather than held in reserve for a future
    offensive. Whether the Leopard rumor is true or not, in manpower terms Ukraine
    continues to pump units into Bakhmut in an unconscionable waste of men. Third
    and finally, all the combat in the east is occurring under an umbrella where
    Russia's supply lines and ISR are robust, creating conditions where Ukraine
    continues to trade at abysmal loss ratios.

    The synthesis of all these points is that Russia is currently driving the
    attrition of the Ukrainian army and denying Ukraine any chance at regaining
    perational initiative, while at the same time pursuing important shaping
    objectives. I believe this is occurring against the backdrop of moderate, but
    not catastrophic organizational disorder and restructuring in the Russian armed
    forces, which are delaying its readiness to launch a large scale offensive. In
    other words, the current pace of Russian operations supports the overall
    attrition of Ukrainian manpower and implies that there is no need to rush an
    ambitious operation until organizational issues have been sorted out.

    In the remainder of this space, I'd like to examine what these organizational
    considerations are and examine two of the ongoing Russian operations (the
    Ugledar and Kreminna axes), looking at them on a fairly granular scale. We'll
    also briefly touch on the bizarre rumors of an immanent widening of the war
    towards Moldova.
    (/quote)
    -- Cont'd at https://bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-schrodingers

    Message Thread: