Since Hamas’s attack on October 7, the Israeli retaliation has unleashed staggering levels of destruction – with the Palestinian death toll now exceeding 10,000. The US has hurried two airplane carriers and several destroyers to the region, along with special military personnel, to bolster its ally and ward off any possible intervention from Iran or Hezbollah. The latter has been engaged in tit-for-tat hostilities with Israel on its northern border, which runs for a hundred kilometers from the Naqoura in the west to the Shebaa farms in the east. This has forced the Israeli army to keep a high number of professional units stationed in the area, as well as maintaining air-force readiness and anti-missile defences. Whether this localized conflict will escalate is now one of the primary questions for the region and the wider world.
Far from being a puppet of Tehran, Hezbollah must be understood as a powerful political party with a strong militia and a significant influence in several countries beyond its native Lebanon – Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen. Its leadership and most of its rank-and-file consider themselves part of the transnational constellation that owes religious obedience to the Iranian Supreme Leader. But Hezbollah does not operate according to orders and fiats, and is itself a decision-maker in Iranian strategy in the Middle East. The final say on its policies comes from secretary general Hasan Nasrallah and his cadre. Their relation to Iran is that of partners, not auxiliaries.
Hamas, too, has a high degree of autonomy, and launched its attack based on its own political calculations rather those of Iran or Hezbollah. It decided that the policies pursued by the Israeli government and its settler population – indefinite occupation and gradual annexation – had reached a tipping point where inaction would prove fatal. This decision was rooted in a broader assessment of the geopolitical transformations taking place across the Middle East. Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel was anticipated by the end of the year. A deal between Iran and the Americans was on the cards. The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, which promises to reinforce the centrality of Gulf states to the global economy, was rapidly becoming a reality. In light of all of this, the ‘international community’ was poised to further marginalize the Palestinian cause and revive the PA as a pliable alternative to Hamas. Internal and external dynamics convinced the organization that it had to either act or accept a slow death.
It is almost certain that Hezbollah had no prior knowledge of the consequent attack. The Lebanese party agrees with Hamas on many issues, and has spent years assisting it with money, arms and tactical advice, yet their geopolitical positions are not always aligned (they were on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, for example). It appears that Hamas’s act of desperation – to engineer a conflict with the aim of reactivating the Palestinian anticolonial struggle and maintaining their political relevance – will not have a straightforward domino effect on Hezbollah. At least not for the time being. By launching limited strikes across the border, Hezbollah is signalling its readiness to open a second front should the pulverization of Gaza reach a point that the party can no longer tolerate. Yet this restrained form of engagement also gives it the space to continually reassess the situation, consider its options and determine its next moves.
At present, the questions facing Nasrallah’s forces are these. Were they to enter a full-blown war with Israel (and possibly the US), would they be able to stop the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the massacre of tens of thousands of Palestinians? Would they risk decimating Lebanon and inflicting tremendous damage on Hezbollah’s support base? Would they lose thousands of fighters and most of their weapons? Would they jeopardize the accomplishments of the resistance axis in Syria, Iraq and Yemen? What would they stand to gain from this hazardous course of action? The answers are liable to change at any moment. The optimum strategy today might be defunct tomorrow. But as yet, it seems that this is Hamas’s war, not Hezbollah’s.
Hezbollah’s options – whether to maintain hostilities with Israel at their current level, escalate them or reduce them – are governed by three important variables. The first is the situation in Gaza. Israel wants to obliterate Hamas in toto, and has been given the green-light to commit genocide in pursuit of this goal, even though its chances of fulfilment are highly uncertain. If Hamas is able to drag out the fighting, inflict significant harm on the enemy and thwart an all-out Israeli victory, then Hezbollah will score major political points with minimal sacrifices, simply by keeping Israel distracted on its northern front. The party could thereby avoid the dangers of escalation and live to fight another war at a more propitious moment.
The second variable is Hezbollah’s power base in Lebanon, which, along with the majority of the Lebanese society, is supportive of the Palestinians but hesitant about a war with Israel. They know very well that, on top of having lost their savings in the 2019-20 Lebanese banking crisis, an Israeli assault would threaten their homes and what remains of their vital national infrastructure. Hezbollah is, understandably, reluctant to endanger and alienate this constituency. The final variable is Iran and its interests, including the diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the delicate negotiations with the Biden administration concerning its nuclear technology and the extent of US sanctions. The Iranian leadership knows that both of these would be upended by a major regional conflict – hence President Raisi’s cautious position and his continued lines of contact with the Saudi Crown Prince.
Yet as Israel’s killing machine mows down Palestinians by the thousands, each of these factors could change. If Hamas appears to be in existential danger, the calculus for Hezbollah may be different – since the loss of this ally could embolden Israel to target its Lebanese adversary next. As for the Lebanese people, it is unclear whether they will continue to prioritize their homes and assets amid the proliferating images of Palestinian body bags. Might they instead prove willing to suffer alongside the Palestinians? The Iranians, too, might have to look again at the balance between their immediate material interests and their nominal commitments to Palestinian liberation. Will they be able to sit face-to-face with US officials while the latter cheers on the immolation of Gaza? Wouldn’t this send the wrong signal to their other allies across the region – that Iranian support is fickle and unreliable?
If the situation in Gaza deteriorates to the point that Iran shelves its negotiations with the US, the Gulf states sour on Israel, and Hezbollah’s base becomes convinced that the party is not doing enough, then this could be a trigger for Hezbollah to escalate. Likewise, if Israel decides to target civilians in Lebanon and causes major casualties, Nasrallah cannot be expected to stand by. For Hezbollah, military intervention is always a political strategy rooted in the arithmetic of gains and losses and the complex field of allies and interests. Its next move will not be decided by Iranian influence or Islamist ideology, but by the demands of pragmatism.The last working-class hero in England.
Clio the cat, ? July 1997 - 1 May 2016 Kira the cat, ? ? 2010 - 3 August 2018 Jasper the Ruffian cat ? ? ? - 4 November 2021
Useful cost-benefit analysis. In passing, has Galloway ever apologised for his doomsday prediction?
This article shows just how complex and multi-layered the dynamics of the Middle East, in reality, are.
Hamas forced into a spasm of action, in desparation, because the alternative is, slow strangulation and demise.
A the very least, Hamas has shown the Middle East and the world, the true character of the Israeli occupation regime and the massive duplicity of the United States, and the slave like attitude of the pathetic Europeans, who seem at the same time to be pretentious and utterly foolish.
Everything now hinges on Hamas and how long they can hold out and continue their resistance to the Israeli war machine. The longer they survive as a military group, the more sympathy they receive from fellow Muslims and the possibility that their bravery and spirit, their willingness to sacrifice themselves, will force an intervention.
If the true death toll, including those buried under the rubble, is closer to twenty thousand, than ten, and a thousand are being killed a day; then we'll soon be nearer to thirty thousand dead Palestinians. Is that ghastly figure the tipping point, or does it have to go higher still?
Re: Useful cost-benefit analysis. In passing, has Galloway ever apologised for his doomsday prediction?
The conclusion, that pragmatism is Ooh-aah's approach, made me smell a rat. Despite the primacy of materialism, beliefs have an influence.The last working-class hero in England.
Clio the cat, ? July 1997 - 1 May 2016 Kira the cat, ? ? 2010 - 3 August 2018 Jasper the Ruffian cat ? ? ? - 4 November 2021
Gallant threatens Hezbollah: 'What we can do in Gaza, we can do in Beirut'
In threats made against the Lebanon-based Hezbollah after remarks by its leader Hassan Nasrallah, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned: "We haven't even 10% of the IAF's power in Gaza."
"Hezbollah is dragging Lebanon to a possible war, and is making mistakes," Israel's Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said at a situational assessment near the Lebanese border Saturday, adding that the Lebanese citizens would be the first to pay the price for this kind of mistake. "What we can do in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut."
In his speech, made alongside the commander of the IDF's Division 91 and other senior officers serving in the region, the defense minister stated that Hezbollah is no longer making just provocations, but aggression, following several exchanges of fire over the border throughout October and early November.
"Our pilots are sitting in their cockpits, their aircraft facing north," Gallant said, stressing that the IDF already has mobilized enough forces for its goals in the South against Hamas, and the Israel Air Force has plenty of power to spare. "We haven't even used 10% of the IAF's power in Gaza."
Responding to threats from Hezbollah leader Nasrallah
Gallant's speech followed statements made earlier in the day by Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah, where the terrorist organization's leader warned Israel against retaliating against them in Lebanon.
"The Israeli cruelty is intended to subjugate the people of the region and crush the legitimate demand for rights," Nasrallah declared in his speech.
"The occupation turns to Lebanon after its crimes in Gaza and deliberate and cruel killings," he continued. "The occupation is making a mistake again, and all its objectives will fail."
I suppose 'beliefs' are important. Everything isn't ruled by rational, logical, cost-benefit analysis, about one's interests. Having wiped the floor with the British and French, the Germans believed they could do the same to the Soviet Union in 1940. What could possibly go wrong?
Anyway, perhaps the opposition/resistance to Israel/USA is biding its time, watching and waiting for the mood among the Arab nations... the Street to reach a level of anger at the events undolding in Gaza, that creates an uncontrollable and unstoppable demand for intervention; something, must be done. What about a no-fly zone? Or is that exclusively a western toy?
I fear that the muted retaliation by local countries is because they want to do as little as possible while still retaining some public credibility....The last working-class hero in England.
Clio the cat, ? July 1997 - 1 May 2016 Kira the cat, ? ? 2010 - 3 August 2018 Jasper the Ruffian cat ? ? ? - 4 November 2021
I think they are more afraid of incurring the wrath of Washington than they are of the reaction of their own people.
Lebanon and Iran would pay a terrible price if they became involved in a war with Israel/USA. Iran, for example, has always had a 'complex' relationship with the Arabs, a bit like Turkey.
Iran knows that the US wants to impose 'regime change' on Iran. Russia and China, might want to see a conflict involving Iran because this would occupy the United States, probably for years, and divert US attention from them for a while.
On the other hand, if all of them agree that war with the United States is inevitable, that the US is set on attacking them and thinks it has the power to do it now, compared to later... then everything becomes far more 'dynamic' and deadly dangerous.
Perhaps because they know what war is, and they know the war will be fought in their own countries. The US et al don't mind war because it always happens far away.
Anyway, perhaps the opposition/resistance to Israel/USA is biding its time, watching and waiting for the mood among the Arab nations..."
I wouldn't hope for much...not From the leadership anyway. Posted this rundown a week or two ago: little has changed I reckon:
Here's a little insight into what ME/Regional Muslim Governments are thinking right now:
🇦🇪(UAE): Attempting to sell themselves as a 'Middle Eastern Switzerland'. Have used their influencers and religious leaders to discourage boycotts and protests. Many in the government think they are being attacked by Iran/Muslim Brotherhood – believe they are the victim of a conspiracy to derail their ties with Israel. To counter the criticism they are getting, spearheading efforts in the UN to support Palestine.
🇸🇦(Saudi): Very busy in events and the pursuit of Vision 2030. Shakira is coming, she takes precedence. Doing basic back-channel diplomacy, but not concerned with Palestine. Secretly hoping America takes out Iran, but do not want a BIG war that brings their key assets like oil plants, desalination plants, airports or seaports under fire. A policy of doing the bare minimum.
🇹🇷(Turkey): Erdoğan says one thing, does another. Local elections are coming up, appealing to his voter base with critique of Israel. Still exporting goods and oil to Israel. A policy of speeches, and then more harsher speeches.
🇯🇴(Jordan): As always in the pocket of America, doing some public condemnation of Israel, but policy has not changed. Calling for installation of air defenses and supporting an American air-bridge to Israel. Tear-gassing protestors and pushing local religious leaders to tell people to stop voicing concern for Palestinians.
🇪🇬(Egypt): Sisi, thinking similar to the Emiratis, wants Hamas gone. Initially allowed protests, now heavily clamping down. Fears public pressure, but militarily assisting Israel. Does not want a Tahrir 2.0, but also does not want to upset his American patrons. Concerned about Israel's plan to push 2.2 million Gazans into the Sinai desert, but might be willing to capitulate for the right price.
🇧🇭 (Bahrain): Working in lockstep with the UAE. Attempting to avoid public attention. Waiting for everything to roll over, so they can go back to normal. As always, offering lip service to Palestine.
🇩🇿(Algeria): Occupied with planting trees and domestic issues currently. Not wanting to recognize the Palestinian issue. After much domestic pushback, the government issued statements in favor of Palestine. A ‘doesn’t concern me’ policy currently.
🇶🇦 (Qatar): Facilitating hostage negotiations and making big attempts to avoid a regional war. Doing their best given the unprecedented amount of American pressure upon them.
🇰🇼 (Kuwait): Among the most loud and loyal to the Palestinian cause. Financially and politically and socially providing support to Palestinians. Encouraging boycotts, protests, and all forms of solidarity.
🇮🇷/🇱🇧 (Iran/Lebanon): The key players in this entire thing. Working closely with proxies to help the Palestinian cause militarily. Taking a major risk to itself and others to strategically defeat the West and to liberate Palestine. Implementing decades long plan to remove the USA from the region.
🇵🇰(Pakistan): Engrossed in domestic politics, trying to somehow either kill Imran Khan or 'remove' him from the picture. No actual support for Palestine other than aid and UN speeches. However, have issued a legitimate warning that if Iran is hit with nuclear weapons, they will nuke Israel in return and provide Turkey with the means to develop its own nukes.
🇸🇾(Syria): Working to defend itself while supporting its local and regional partners. Does not have much to fight with but committed to a big war to defend Palestine if it breaks out.
🇾🇪(Yemen): Finger on the trigger, looking forward to inflicting a loss on the Saudis, Israelis, and everyone else they think they've been wronged by. Increasing their presence in the war, have shot above American naval assets and has used ballistic missiles.
Also, to note:
1. The Muslim countries all feel like they are on a poker table waiting for someone to make a move. There is talk of expelling Israeli ambassadors, but everyone is waiting for someone else to do it. Current discussion in the UAE has said if Turkey expels their ambassador and sever ties, then they could be 'willing' to do the same for example. 2. Past grievances on other regional issues and wars is playing a major role in decision-making, the countries are putting their own disputes before the safety of Gazans. 3. Everyone wants to be seen as the 'liberators of Al-Aqsa' so that they can get the prestige and power that comes with such a title, however there is little work towards it. Everyone is shooting down each other, almost as if we are on a school yard and no one likes anyone and everyone is bringing down each other. 4. The above in NO WAY reflects public sentiment. Every single country's populations are in FULL support of Palestine, with many calling for major action and a final battle to solve the issue once and for all.
Please feel free to discuss, ignore or share the above. Thank you!