I have now been in Caracas for 48 hours and the contrast between what I have seen, and what I had read in the mainstream media, could not be more stark.
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In all of this I have not seen one single checkpoint, whether police or military. I have seen almost no guns; fewer than you would see on a similar tour taking in Whitehall. I have not been stopped once, whether on foot or in a car. I have seen absolutely zero sign of "Chavista militia" whether in poor, wealthy or central areas. I drove extensively round the opposition strongholds of Las Mercedes and Altamira and quite literally saw not a single armed policemen, not one militia man and not one soldier. People were out and about quite happily and normally. There was no feeling of repression whatsoever.
Again, nobody stopped me or asked who I am or why I was taking pictures. I did ask the Venezuelan authorities whether I needed a permit to take photos and publish articles, and their reply was a puzzled "why would you?"
The military checkpoints to maintain control, the roving gangs of Chavista armed groups, all the media descriptions of Caracas today are entirely a figment of CIA and Machado propaganda, simply regurgitated by a complicit billionaire and state media.
Do you know what else do not exist? The famous "shortages." The only thing in short supply is shortage. There is a shortage of shortage. There is no shortage of anything in Venezuela.
A few weeks ago I saw on Twitter a photo of a supermarket in Caracas which somebody had put up to demonstrate that the shelves are extremely well stocked. It received hundreds of replies, either claiming it was a fake, or that it was an elite supermarket for the wealthy and that the shops for the majority were empty.
So I made a point, in working-class districts, of going into the neighbourhood, front room stores where ordinary people do their shopping. They were all very well stocked. There were no empty places on shelves. I also went round outdoor and covered markets, including an improbably huge one with over a hundred stalls catering solely for children's birthday parties!
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The African festival was instructive. A community event and not a political rally, there were nevertheless numerous spontaneous shouts and chants for Maduro. The Catholic priest giving the blessing at the festivities suddenly started talking of the genocide in Gaza and everybody prayed for Palestine. Community and cultural figures continually referenced socialism.
This is the natural environment here. None of it is forced. Chavez empowered the downtrodden and improved their lives in a spectacular manner, for which there are few parallels. The result is genuine popular enthusiasm and a level of public working-class engagement with political thought that it is impossible to compare to the UK today. It is the antithesis of the hollowed out culture that has spawned Reform.
I am very wary of Western journalists who parachute into a country and become instant experts. Although the stark contradiction between actual Caracas and Western-media Caracas is so extreme that I can bring it to you immediately.
Pretty well everything that I have read by Western journalists which can be immediately checked - checkpoints, armed political gangs, climate of fear, shortages of food and goods - turns out to be an absolute lie. I did not know this before I came. Possibly neither did you. We both do now.
I had lived for years in Nigeria and Uzbekistan under real dictatorships and I know what they feel like. I can tell sullen compliance from real engagement. I can tell spontaneous from programmed political expression. This is no dictatorship.
I am, so far as I can judge, the only Western journalist in Venezuela now. The idea that you should actually see for yourself what is happening, rather than reproduce what the Western governments and their agents tell you is happening, appears utterly out of fashion with our mainstream media. I am sure this is deliberate.
When I was in Lebanon a year ago, the mainstream media were entirely absent as Israel devastated Dahiya, the Bekaa Valley, and Southern Lebanon, because it was a narrative they did not want to report.
Disgracefully, the only time the BBC entered Southern Lebanon was from the Israeli side, embedded with the IDF.
The BBC, Guardian or New York Times simply will not send a correspondent to Caracas because the reality is so starkly different from the official narrative.
One narrative which the Western powers are desperate to have you believe is that Acting President Delcy Rodríguez betrayed Maduro and facilitated his capture. That is not what Maduro believes. It is not what his party believes, and I have been unable to find the slightest indication that anybody believes this in Venezuela.
The security services house journal, the Guardian, published about their fifth article making this claim, and flagged it as front-page lead and a major scoop. Yet all of the sources for the Guardian story are still the same US government sources, or Machado supporters from the wealthy Miami community of exiled capitalist parasites.
What is interesting is why the security services wish you to believe that Delcy Rodríguez and her brother Jorge, Speaker of the National Assembly, are agents for the USA. Opposition to US Imperialism has defined their entire lives since their father was tortured to death at the behest of the CIA when they were infants. They are both vocal in their continuing support for the Bolivarian Revolution and personally for Maduro.
The obvious American motive is to split and weaken the ruling party in Caracas and undermine the government of Venezuela. That was my reading. But it has also been suggested to me that Trump is pushing heavily the line that Rodríguez is pro-American in order both to claim victory, and to justify his lack of support for Machado. Rubio and many like him are keen to see Machado installed, but Trump's assessment that she does not have the support to run the country seems from here entirely correct.
A variation on this that has also been suggested to me is that Trump wants to portray Rodríguez as pro-American to reassure American oil companies it is safe to invest (though exactly why he wants that is something of a mystery).
nmClio the cat, ?July 1997-1 May 2016 Kira the cat, ??2010-3 August 2018 Jasper the Ruffian cat ???-4 November 2021 Georgina the cat ?2006-4 December 2025 Toni the cat ?2005-25 March 2026
Sleboda, on the other hand, is in no doubt that Maduro was betrayed by his own people.
He makes the point that in the war for Mogadishu the Somalis were able to shoot down a US military helicopter using a shoulder-held missile launcher. Venezuela possesses over 5,000 of these missile launchers yet not one missile was fired. And these weapons can not be jammed or interfered with in any way. Helicopters are extremely vulnerable to such attacks. But not in Venezuela, apparently.
"Leaves on the track"?
That's utter nonsense that the 2004 Igla-S can't be jammed! Directed IR Countermeasures detect and
- track the missile, firing a laser at the seeker aperture, blinding it and modulating the frequency so as to interfere with the internal signals that the missile uses for tracking, causing it to steer away from the target.
Currently deployed DIRCM systems on aircraft include Northrop Grumman AN/AAQ-24 Nemesis & CIRCM (used on the 160th SOAR helicopters carrying the US special forces), Leonardo Miysis.
A cheaper alternative to such systems, since the Igla-S has a dual band seeker, is to use "dark"/spectral flares, which run cooler and emit minimal UV, more closely approximating an aircraft.
To overcome the missile's logic assessing that a flare decelerates much faster than the aircraft, kinematic dark flares which keep pace with it, would be used. Another alternative is for the aircraft to brake hard when releasing such flares.
How would they deal with dozens of such missiles fired at the same time?
These also differ from MANPADs in giving much less warning.
The Battle of Mogadishu was in October 1993 and the US attack occurred in daylight, with two helis being shot down at 1620h and 1640h and a third hit at 1908h but returned to base.
A week prior to this, another heli had been shot down by RPG at night.
DIRCM wasn't fielded by the US until later in the decade, and wouldn't have been effective against RPGs which is when you'd use flares.
Doh, of course flares wouldn't be effective against RPGs since they don't have a seeker! (nm)
Sleboda admits to the US regime change playbook having been tried in Iran in vain. Why not in Venezuela too, with the successful takedown of C4ISR being the prime cause?
While I'm here, I may as well mention my disappointment with Sleboda's analysis of the fall of Syria.
Sleboda blamed Assad for the overthrow of the Syrian government, spurning the advances of Russia and approaching the GCC for funds to rebuild Syria instead.
Sleboda made a throw away remark that Russia had vetoed the involvement of Iran in training and arming the Syrian military b/c Russia feared it would lead to sectarianism. Had he known and met Syrians of various faiths and none (as I have), he would have known that they regard themselves as Syrians first, with ethnicities and religions second (apart from some Kurds, it appears).
No wonder Iran had doubts about Russian largesse, given the pre-conditions involved!
Vanessa Beeley has exposed Russia's role in the Syrian travesty, which flat out exposes Sleboda's analysis as being the "hollowed out shell" he likes to throw around.
Elijah Magnier was the first person I heard talk about Russia kicking Iran out of Syria
Venezuelan defenders used Igla systems on January 3 but lacked training - Russian envoy
26 Jan 2026
The Venezuelan side fired at least two shots from Igla·S portable missile systems during the United States’ operation to capture the republic’s leader Nicolas Maduro, but local specialists apparently did not have sufficient training, Russian Ambassador to Caracas Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov said.
"Shots fired from the Igla system did occur. I was informed that there were at least two shots, and both missiles failed to hit their target," the diplomat said on Russia-24 television. -- https://tass.com/politics/2076773
Cyber attack on the power grid, leading to outages and egradation of C4ISR incl. comms,
How Did the U.S. Break Venezuela's Russian Air Defenses in Two Hours?
Lede: Operation Absolute Resolve neutralized Caracas's Russian-built air defense network through cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and fifth-generation aircraft, exposing systemic failures in maintenance, readiness, and deterrence that led to Nicolás Maduro's capture
Absolute Resolve, the U.S. military operation carried out in Venezuela in early January 2026 marked one of the most consequential interventions in Latin America in the post-Cold War era.
It was not merely the arrest of Nicolás Maduro that made the operation extraordinary, but the manner in which it was executed: swiftly, with overwhelming technical coordination, and without reported casualties among U.S. forces.
At the center of this outcome was the rapid and decisive neutralization of Venezuela's air defense network over Caracas, a system long portrayed by the Venezuelan government as one of the most powerful in the region and a cornerstone of the regime's deterrence strategy.
The collapse of this network exposed not only technological and logistical weaknesses but also deeper structural flaws rooted in neglect, overconfidence, and a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern warfare is conducted.
For years, Maduro had relied on the image of a formidable, Russian-built air defense shield to project strength domestically and defiance internationally.
During repeated verbal confrontations with Washington, particularly during the presidency of Donald Trump, Maduro frequently boasted of Venezuela's ability to repel any aerial attack. He cited the deployment of advanced Russian systems such as Pantsir, Buk-M2, and Igla-S missiles, integrated with Chinese radar technology, as proof that Venezuela possessed the most robust air defense architecture in Latin America.
This narrative was not without some basis in fact. Beginning in the late 2000s, Venezuela invested heavily in air defense, acquiring a layered network designed to counter threats at multiple altitudes and ranges. On paper, the system appeared formidable, especially in a region where most countries place limited emphasis on air defense due to the low likelihood of interstate air conflict.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia supplied Venezuela with a range of air defense systems between 2008 and 2014, though SIPRI itself notes that its data are incomplete due to limited transparency. Beyond what is publicly documented, experts widely believe that Venezuela possessed additional systems and variants not fully accounted for in open sources.
Over time, this accumulation produced one of the densest air defense networks in Latin America, combining long- and medium-range missile systems with short-range defenses and thousands of man-portable air defense missiles. In October 2024, reports indicated that Russia had delivered additional Pantsir, Buk-M2, and Igla-S systems, reinforcing the perception that Venezuela's defenses were being maintained and upgraded.
The political symbolism of these acquisitions was significant. Russian military support became a central pillar of Maduro's claim that Venezuela could withstand U.S. pressure and intervention. In 2015, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was awarded Venezuela's Order of Merit for National Security, a gesture underscoring the depth of military cooperation between Caracas and Moscow at the time.
As late as October 2025, Maduro publicly claimed that Venezuela possessed at least 5,000 Igla-S missiles, asserting that "all the armed forces of the world know the power of the Igla-S missile." Such statements reinforced the idea of an impregnable aerial shield, both for domestic audiences and for potential adversaries.
Yet beneath this carefully cultivated image lay a far more fragile reality. Advanced air defense systems are not static symbols of power; they are complex, maintenance-intensive networks that require constant investment in training, logistics, spare parts, software updates, and integration. By the mid-2020s, Venezuela's economic collapse, compounded by international sanctions and chronic mismanagement, had severely degraded its ability to sustain such systems. Reports from Western and Russian experts alike suggested that many Venezuelan air defense units were only partially operational. Some systems had been kept running by cannibalizing parts from others, while maintenance schedules were irregular or nonexistent. Promised modernization and repair support from Russia increasingly failed to materialize as Moscow's strategic priorities shifted and its own resources became stretched.
This deterioration occurred alongside a gradual decline in Russia's engagement with Venezuela. Although Maduro reportedly requested additional military support from both Russia and China in late 2025, amid growing U.S. military activity in the Caribbean, the response from Moscow appeared limited. While China continued to provide radar systems and other forms of cooperation, neither partner demonstrated the willingness or capacity to fundamentally restore Venezuela's air defense readiness. The result was a system that looked formidable in parades and speeches but was deeply compromised at the operational level.
The U.S. operation exploited these vulnerabilities through a meticulously planned, multi-domain campaign that integrated cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, intelligence operations, and precision kinetic strikes. According to General Dan Caine, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, more than 150 aircraft of various types participated in the operation on the night of January 3, 2026. These included fifth-generation stealth fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, electronic warfare platforms, drones, bombers, and helicopters. The scale and diversity of the force underscored the importance Washington placed on achieving rapid and uncontested control of the air over Caracas.
The operation began with a cyberattack that disrupted much of Caracas's electrical grid. While the civilian impact was immediate and severe, the primary military objective was to degrade Venezuela's command, control, and communications infrastructure. Modern air defense systems depend heavily on reliable power and centralized data flows to coordinate radar coverage, identify targets, and assign interceptors. By paralyzing these networks, U.S. planners effectively fragmented Venezuela's air defense, isolating individual units and preventing them from functioning as a coherent whole.
With command and control disrupted, U.S. aircraft began approaching Venezuelan airspace under conditions that favored stealth and surprise. The combination of power outages, electronic jamming, and radar-evading aircraft allowed U.S. forces to advance with minimal detection. According to reports in the Washington Post, at least six key air defense installations around Caracas were targeted to secure an aerial corridor into the capital. These included defenses near the port of La Guaira, the La Carlota air base, and the sprawling military complex of Fuerte Tiuna, which serves as a central hub of Venezuela's armed forces.
Satellite imagery taken shortly after the operation revealed extensive damage at these sites. Destroyed vehicles, disabled radar installations, and the remains of Buk missile launchers were visible at La Carlota and Fuerte Tiuna. These images contradicted years of official rhetoric and highlighted the gap between the perceived strength of Venezuela's defenses and their actual condition. What had been promoted as a layered, resilient shield proved unable to withstand a coordinated assault that targeted not only physical assets but the information systems that supported them.
Stealth aircraft played a critical role in this phase of the operation. Fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35 are designed to minimize radar detection, making them exceptionally difficult targets for many existing air defense systems. Russian military analyst Yuri Fiodorov noted that even advanced systems like the S-400 can struggle against such aircraft under certain conditions. Venezuela, which relied on older systems like Buk variants and Pantsir, faced even greater challenges. When combined with electronic warfare that degraded radar performance and real-time intelligence that guided targeting decisions, the advantage enjoyed by U.S. forces became overwhelming.
Electronic warfare further eroded what remained of Venezuela's defensive capability. By jamming radar signals, disrupting communications, and injecting false data into enemy networks, U.S. forces effectively blinded air defense units that were still operational. Western analysts emphasized that no air defense system, regardless of its technical specifications, can function effectively when deprived of accurate information and coordination. In Caracas, this informational collapse occurred rapidly, leaving individual missile batteries unable to detect, track, or engage incoming threats in a meaningful way.
Terrain also played a decisive role. Caracas is surrounded by rugged mountains and complex topography that create natural blind spots for radar coverage. Many Russian-designed air defense systems are optimized for flatter terrain, where radar horizons are more predictable. In mountainous environments, low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles can exploit valleys and terrain masking to remain below radar coverage until the final moments of an attack. Analysts cited by The Telegraph argued that U.S. aircraft took full advantage of these conditions, flying at low altitude and using the terrain to conceal their approach.
Despite these technical and environmental factors, several experts emphasized that human and organizational failures were equally decisive. Years of economic hardship had eroded morale, training, and readiness within Venezuela's armed forces. Maintaining high alert levels requires constant effort, resources, and discipline - luxuries that were increasingly scarce. Yuri Fiodorov argued that Venezuelan forces had grown complacent, assuming that an actual U.S. attack was unlikely despite years of hostile rhetoric. This assumption proved fatal. In his assessment, the failure of Venezuela's air defense was less about the inherent limitations of Russian systems and more about the inability of Venezuelan operators to keep them fully prepared for a sudden, coordinated assault.
Intelligence penetration further compounded these weaknesses. U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, reportedly played a key role in identifying vulnerabilities within Venezuela's defense network. Such efforts likely provided detailed information about the location, readiness, and operating procedures of air defense units, as well as insight into internal dysfunctions. In some cases, "internal work" - a euphemism for cooperation or assistance from insiders - may have delayed responses or sabotaged systems at critical moments. While details remain classified, the speed and precision of the operation strongly suggest a high degree of prior intelligence preparation.
The entire operation lasted approximately two hours. During that time, U.S. forces achieved sufficient control of the air to allow special operations units to move into Caracas and detain Nicolás Maduro. The absence of reported casualties among U.S. forces was presented as evidence of the operation's effectiveness and precision. From Washington's perspective, the rapid neutralization of air defenses minimized the risk of escalation and collateral damage, even as it raised profound political and legal questions on the international stage.
For Russia, the events in Venezuela represented a significant embarrassment. Images of destroyed Buk launchers and disabled Pantsir systems circulated widely, prompting renewed scrutiny of Russian air defense exports. While Russian experts emphasized that poor maintenance, lack of spare parts, and human error were decisive factors, the episode nonetheless reinforced concerns among current and potential customers about the real-world performance of these systems. At the same time, many analysts cautioned against simplistic conclusions. Air defense systems do not operate in isolation, and their effectiveness depends on integration, training, doctrine, and the nature of the threat they face. In Venezuela's case, all of these elements were compromised.
The broader implications of the operation extend beyond Venezuela. For Latin American militaries, the collapse of a heavily armed air defense network served as a cautionary tale. It demonstrated that acquiring advanced hardware is not enough; without sustained investment in maintenance, training, and integration, even sophisticated systems can become hollow symbols of power. Strategically, the operation highlighted the declining influence of Russia in parts of the region and underscored the challenges faced by countries that rely heavily on foreign military aid without ensuring long-term operational readiness.
At a doctrinal level, the events of January 2026 illustrated the evolution of air warfare. Modern suppression of enemy air defenses is no longer limited to the physical destruction of radar and missile sites. It encompasses cyberattacks on infrastructure, electronic warfare against sensors and communications, intelligence operations that exploit internal weaknesses, and precision strikes guided by real-time data. Control of the air is increasingly a matter of information dominance - the ability to see, decide, and act faster than one's opponent.
The neutralization of Venezuela's air defense over Caracas was not the result of a single technological breakthrough or tactical maneuver, but the culmination of years of neglect, overconfidence, shifting geopolitical alliances, and a failure to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. Systems once hailed as symbols of defiance proved incapable of protecting the regime they were meant to defend. The events of January 2026 serve as a sobering reminder that military strength is not measured solely by the weapons a nation possesses, but by its ability to maintain, integrate, and employ them effectively in an ever-evolving strategic environment.
Venezuela's air defences failed due to systemic neutralisation rather than mechanical failure. This was achieved through decision-centric warfare, command chain strangulation, political friction, intelligence operations, and technological suppression, leading to a "decision freeze" among commanders.
on January 26, 2026, 6:19 pm