NEXTA @nexta_tv 20h The U.S. is setting records for fertilizer purchases from Russia
In March, the United States imported more than $240 million worth of Russian fertilizers — the highest level in the history of bilateral trade.
For the quarter, the total reached $564 million, up 37% year-on-year.
Russian fertilizers remain competitive due to cheap natural gas used in production — which keeps prices lower.
Sanctions have also had an unexpected effect: new U.S. tariffs did not hit Russia but affected its competitors, tilting the market in Moscow’s favor.
The situation was further worsened by the crisis in the Middle East. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz pushed many suppliers out of the market, sending fertilizer prices sharply higher.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. is forced to buy from Russia — otherwise the impact on agriculture would be severe.
In March, the United States increased imports of fertilizers from Russia to the maximum World
Source: OREANDA-NEWS OREANDA-NEWS In March of this year, the United States imported fertilizers from Russia for the maximum 243.9 million dollars for the entire time of trade between the two countries, and the cost of supplies almost doubled in a month, RIA Novosti found out after examining data from the American statistical service.
At the same time, imports did not grow so much in annual terms - by 11%. And according to the results of the first quarter of this year, the cost of imports amounted to 564.4 million dollars, which is 37% more than in the same period a year earlier.
In March, Americans purchased nitrogen fertilizers the most - for $ 206.6 million. Potash (21.8 million), phosphorous (9.2 million) and mixed fertilizers (6.3 million dollars) were also imported.
As a result, Russia returned to the second place among the main suppliers of fertilizers to the United States. Canada traditionally took the first place with 354.2 million dollars, Saudi Arabia (143.2 million dollars), Oman (83.3 million) and Qatar (82.03 million) also entered the top five.
By the end of March, the United States increased fertilizer imports by a third on a monthly basis and by 26% year-on-year, to a maximum of $1.297 billion since April 2022Tell your story; Ask a question; Interpret generously http://storybythethroat.wordpress.com/tell-ask-listen/
FT: Russia reaps fertiliser windfall from Iran war
Russia reaps fertiliser windfall from Iran war Global disruption fuels calls for western curbs on Russian exports to be eased
Susannah Savage in London and Max Seddon in Berlin Published yesterday
Russia is benefiting from a sharp rise in fertiliser prices driven by the US-Israel war against Iran, as other major suppliers in the Middle East halt production and struggle to ship exports via the Strait of Hormuz.
The shift has put European supplies at risk, giving fresh impetus to Russia-friendly EU countries to argue that the bloc should ease restrictions on Russian fertiliser imposed in response to the war in Ukraine.
“Russia is one of the main beneficiaries [of the war] as a large commodities producer, but that’s how it is — that’s not just oil and gas, but fertiliser as well,” said Andrey Sizov, managing director of grain consultancy SovEcon. “As you go down the chain of agricultural products, the price of those is going up as well, and Russia has pretty large reserves.”
Russia’s dominance of the global fertiliser market exceeds even its position in oil and gas markets, accounting for 23 per cent of ammonia exports, 14 per cent of urea and, together with ally Belarus, 40 per cent of potash. Its shipments remain unaffected by Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Middle East urea prices, the global benchmark, have soared 44 per cent since the beginning of the war to more than $670 a tonne.
Moscow is already receiving up to $150mn extra budget revenue from oil sales a day, amid the surge in prices caused by the war.
The Kremlin has portrayed the crisis in commodities markets as a way to bring Russia back in from the cold after four years of sanctions on its exports over President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russia temporarily halted exports of ammonium nitrate on Tuesday to prioritise domestic producers, underlining Moscow’s ability to affect reeling markets.
“Russia is well positioned for the predicted and emerging Era of Extreme Scarcity,” Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s special envoy for economic co-operation, wrote on X in response.
Dmitriev predicted that, as “global supply chains break, both Russia’s partners and adversaries will appreciate even more its critical role” as an exporter.
The impact is already being felt in Europe, where Belarusian potash remains banned and tariffs and duties apply to nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and Belarus.
Russian fertiliser exports to the EU were worth about €2bn last year, although volumes have fallen since new levies introduced in 2025 began to take effect.
Hungary’s government, a long-standing advocate of lifting EU sanctions on Russia, has asked Brussels to ease fertiliser restrictions. In a letter to the European Commission on Monday, Hungarian agriculture minister István Nagy warned that limited access to cheaper imports could lead to lower yields and higher food prices, particularly in countries reliant on imported phosphorus and potash.
Washington said last week it would ease sanctions on several Belarusian producers including state company Belaruskali, potentially allowing exports to increase.
But there was little indication the EU would be willing to loosen its restrictions, according to Chris Lawson, head of fertilisers at consultancy CRU.
He said that Russia could not fully replace disrupted volumes from the Middle East, even if output rises this year. Russia is expected to export about 9.5mn tonnes of urea in 2026, or around 15–16 per cent of global trade. By contrast, Gulf producers account for closer to a third of traded global supply.
Sizov cautioned that plants were already running at about 90 per cent of capacity. Ammonium nitrate production facilities also make explosives for the Russian military and face Ukrainian drone strikes.
But Moscow is well positioned to use its exports as a tool to push back against western sanctions and convince emerging markets to back its cause. The impact of the war on global agriculture markets could swing further in Russia’s favour in the medium term, as import-dependent nations were forced to plant less and supply shocks sparked food price inflation, said Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
“An official from an Asian or African country who needs urea before the monsoon does not discuss the Ukrainian question. He calls the Kremlin, and the Kremlin picks up,” she said.
“Russia can convert market power into political rent — extracting geopolitical returns by positioning itself as an irreplaceable supplier.” Tell your story; Ask a question; Interpret generously http://storybythethroat.wordpress.com/tell-ask-listen/
Lol, they had to say it: 'Russia is weaponising access to its fertiliser supplies'
Look at how salty this European Council on Foreign Relations hack is about the situation. You can bet if the tables were turned she would be singing the praises of the Glorious Superpower coming to the aid of the world's poor farmers and only asking for a few diplomatic favours in return. All this despite a mortal enemy being the one responsible for the shortage - and we're magnanimous enough to supply them too!
Sowing discord: How Russia is making the most of a global fertiliser shortage
Amid fears of an Iran war-fuelled global food crisis, Moscow is weaponising access to its fertiliser supplies in both Western countries and developing economies
Agathe Demarais @agathedemarais.com on Bluesky Senior Policy Fellow
Commentary 15 April 2026 3 minute read
Earlier in April, US president Donald Trump announced a naval blockade of Iranian ports, compounding disruptions to traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—the maritime route through which around one-third of global seaborne fertiliser supplies flow. Russia could not have asked for a better gift. The country is the second-biggest producer and largest exporter of fertilisers, and these shipments do not transit via Hormuz. The Kremlin is now weaponising access to these supplies in a bid to curry favour in the global south and secure Western sanctions relief.
Russia’s crisis-diplomacy playbook
Developing economies are particularly reliant on Russian fertilisers, for good reason. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western countries have been imposing restrictions on purchases of Russian fertilisers, pushing Moscow to diversify its export routes towards the global south. This strategy has paid off. In 2025, Russian firms supplied roughly one-quarter of the fertiliser imports of agricultural giants Brazil and India.
Amid growing fears that disruptions through Hormuz could trap fertiliser shipments and fuel a global food crisis, the Kremlin has sensed an opportunity: in late March, the deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, Alexander Venediktov, stated that Moscow is ready to send fertilisers to the global south. This generous offer comes with a catch: Venediktov hinted that those receiving fertilisers would need to support the development of Russian-led groupings, such as BRICS, the defence-oriented Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. In other words, Moscow is now attaching strings to its fertiliser shipments.
Russia’s crisis diplomacy playbook is nothing new. During the covid-19 pandemic, Moscow weaponised access to its Sputnik V vaccine, offering doses to global south countries in exchange for economic deals or political alignment. This strategy was perhaps most obvious in Latin America. In Bolivia, for example, Moscow linked vaccine deliveries to Gazprom’s development of the Incahuasi gas field and to Rosatom’s construction of a nuclear technology research centre. A few months later, this strategy paid off: Bolivia was among the five Latin American countries that abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations (the four others were Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Venezuela).
In most countries, Russia’s vaccine diplomacy ended up in a failure. Delivery delays, a lack of transparency over clinical data and doubts around the quality of some vaccine batches fuelled general hesitancy towards the Russian-made jab, which never received approval from the World Health Organisation. Yet this sober analysis eclipses a broader point: for Russia, vaccine deliveries never really mattered. For the Kremlin, vaccine diplomacy was a public-relations operation. What counted for Moscow was to be seen as coming to the rescue of the global south at a time when rich economies were perceived as hoarding vaccines. In a similar fashion, what matters for the Kremlin nowadays is to claim that it will send fertilisers to the global south. Actual deliveries are an afterthought.
Russia does not have the capacity to beef up fertiliser exports anyway. The Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, which moves ammonia to Black Sea export terminals, has remained offline since 2022 (the pipeline runs through active combat areas in Ukraine and has suffered extensive damage). What’s more, Ukrainian drone strikes often hit Russian fertiliser plants, further degrading production capacity. Just one week before Venediktov made his generous offer, the Kremlin imposed strict caps on fertiliser exports in a bid to prevent domestic shortages. This highlights how Russian offers to come to the rescue of developing economies are moot: at best, Moscow can replace Gulf-made supplies only at the margin.
Pressure on the West
Russia’s fertiliser diplomacy is not confined to the global south: it also targets America and Europe. But this time, Moscow’s goal is different: securing sanctions relief. This strategy is already paying off in the US: in late March Washington lifted sanctions on three Belarusian potash makers, including the world’s second-largest producer Belaruskali. It is hard to imagine that the timing—amid growing fears of rising fertiliser prices and a potential food crisis—was incidental.
The European Union could soon be under intense pressure to follow suit. In late March the French food safety body revealed that the French population absorbs high levels of cadmium, a metal linked to cancer which is found in Moroccan-made fertilisers. This development suits the Kremlin perfectly. Under the guise of an environmental crusade, Russian fertiliser giant PhosAgro has long been pushing for a tightening of EU cadmium limits in a bid to promote EU purchases of low-cadmium supplies from Russia’s Kola peninsula.
This leaves the EU with no good option. The bloc can either ease restrictions on Russian fertilisers—thereby funding Moscow’s war machine and dismantling EU sanctions—or stick to high-cadmium supplies, fuelling a health crisis. Russia will likely use France, where the narrative that sanctions hurt Europe is mainstream, as a pressure point to divide Europeans.
Whatever happens in Iranian waters, Russia’s fertiliser diplomacy will cement the Kremlin’s narrative that a US-led war is starving the global south
Western governments never imagined that fertilisers could carry such strategic weight, and they have no playbook to counter Russia’s fertiliser diplomacy. The fate of Hormuz remains uncertain, but seen from the Kremlin, fertiliser diplomacy is already a resounding success before a single extra shipment has even left Russian ports (if it ever does). Whatever happens in Iranian waters, Russia’s fertiliser diplomacy will cement the Kremlin’s narrative that a US-led war is starving the global south and that sanctions relaxation is the only viable option for Western economies. For Moscow, this is a golden scenario—whether Hormuz reopens in just three days or in three years. Tell your story; Ask a question; Interpret generously http://storybythethroat.wordpress.com/tell-ask-listen/
"Weaponising" and controlling the "kinetics" of fertiliser supply...how dastardly of 'em! (nm)
nmClio the cat, ?July 1997-1 May 2016 Kira the cat, ??2010-3 August 2018 Jasper the Ruffian cat ???-4 November 2021 Georgina the cat ?2006-4 December 2025 Toni the cat ?2005-25 March 2026
on May 7, 2026, 12:29 pm