How Europe’s New Political Class Began Rejecting Reality


Glenn Diesen
Oct 26, 2024

Russia considers NATO’s incursion into Ukraine to be an existential threat, and NATO has openly stated its intention to make Ukraine a member state after the war. Without a political settlement that restores Ukraine’s neutrality, Russia will therefore likely annex the strategic territories it cannot accept ending up under NATO control and then turn what remains of Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. As the war is being lost, the rational policy for the Europeans would therefore be to offer an agreement based on ending NATO’s eastward expansion to save Ukrainian lives, territory and the nation itself. Yet, no European leader has been able to even suggest such a solution publicly. Why?

Present the average European politician, journalist or academic with the following thought experiment: If you were an advisor to the Kremlin, what would be your advice to Russia if there are no negotiations to resolve the Ukraine War? Most would feel morally compelled to give ridiculous answers such as advising the Kremlin to capitulate and withdraw, even if Russia is on the cusp of victory. Any impulse to adhere to reason and address Russia’s security concerns would likely be deterred by the threat of being shamed for “legitimising” Russia’s invasion.

What explains the decline of strategic thinking, pragmatism and rationality in European politics?

Europe’s Reality as a Social Construction

The political class that emerged in Europe after the Cold War have become excessively ideological and committed to narratives to socially construct new realities. The Europeans embrace of postmodernism entails questioning the existence of objective reality as our understanding of reality is shaped by language, culture and unique historical perspectives. The postmodernists therefore often seek to change narratives and language as a source of political power. If reality is a social construction, then the grand narratives can be more important than facts. Indeed, ideological narratives must be defended from inconvenient facts.

The European project had the benign intentions of creating a common liberal democratic European identity that would transcend the divisive national rivalry and power politics of the past. The relevance of objective reality is contested, and narratives about reality are believed to reflect power structures that can be dismantled and reorganised.

The prevalence of constructivism and focus on “speech acts” in the EU has led to the belief that even using realist analysis and discussing competing national interests entail legitimising realpolitik and thus socially constructing a more dangerous reality. Speech acts refer to the use of language as a source of power by constructing political realities and influencing outcomes. By reducing the focus on security competition in the international system, it is assumed that power politics can be mitigated.

Is it possible to socially construct a new reality? Do we transcend security competition by not addressing it or do we neglect the responsible management of security competition. Can we transcend national rivalries by focusing on common values or does the neglect of national interests result in decline?
but then be treated as a dangerous force to be contained. Either way, Russia would not have a seat at the table in Europe. Liberal democratic tropes justified why the largest state in Europe should eventually be the only state without representation.

The expansion of NATO and the EU as exclusive blocs also imposes an “us-or-them” dilemma on the deeply divided societies in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Yet, rather than recognising the predictable destabilisation of divided societies in a divided Europe, it is presented as positive-sum “European integration” despite the implicit decoupling from Russia. Societies prioritising closer relations with Russia rather than NATO and the EU are delegitimised for rejecting democracy while their leaders are dismissed as authoritarian “Putinists” who deprive their people of their European dream.

The moral framing of the world convinced European leaders to support a coup to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit. It was common knowledge that only a small minority of Ukrainians desired NATO membership and that it would likely trigger a war, yet liberal democratic rhetoric still convinced European leaders to ignore reality and supporting disastrous policies. Common sense could be shamed.

Western political leaders, journalists and academics seeking to mitigate the security competition by addressing Russia’s legitimate security concerns are similarly accused of carrying water for Putin, repeating Kremlin talking points, “legitimising” Russian policies, and undermining liberal democracy. With the binary moral framing of good versus evil, intellectual pluralism and dissent are castigated as immoral.

Besides being plagued by war, Europe is also undergoing economic decline. The Europeans are buying Russian energy through India as an intermediary as they are morally obliged to follow failed sanctions. The virtue-signalling contributes to European industries becoming less competitive. The de-industrialisation of Europe is also caused by the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines, yet the event that is destroying decades of industrial development is memory-holed as the only two suspects are the US and Ukraine. Furthermore, the US offers subsidies to the subsequent uncompetitive European industries if they relocate across the Atlantic. In the absence of acceptable narratives, the Europeans simply keep silent and do not defend their national interests. The narrative of liberal democracies united by values rather than divided by competing interests must be defended from inconvenient facts.
out. Meeting with opponents during crises runs the risk of legitimising them.

Neutrality was until recently considered a moral stance that mitigates security competition and enables a state to serve as a mediator rather than becoming entangled and escalating conflicts. In a struggle between good and evil, neutrality is also deemed to be immoral. The belt of neutral states that existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries has now been dismantled and even war becomes a virtuous defence of moral principles.

How to Restore Rationality & Correct the Post-Cold War Mistakes?

The failure to establish a mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement that would remove the dividing lines in Europe and enhance indivisible security has resulted in a predictable catastrophe. Yet, course correction requires nothing less than reconsidering the policies of the past 30 years and the concept of Europe at a moment when animosity is rampant on both sides. The European project was envisioned as the embodiment of Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis and an entire political class has based their legitimacy on conforming to the idea that developing a Europe without Russia was a recipe for peace and stability.

Does Europe have the rationality, political imagination and courage to critically assess its own mistakes and contribution to the current crisis, or will all criticism continue to be denounced as a threat to liberal democracy?


[1] Schimmelfennig, Frank, 2003. The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: Rules and rhetoric, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, page 208.

[2] B. Clinton, ‘Remarks to Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe’, US Diplomatic Mission to Germany, 9 January 1994.

[3] J. Borger, ‘Russian hostility 'partly caused by west', claims former US defence head’, The Guardian, 9 March 2016.


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